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DO CODE VIOLATIONS AND LIENS RUN WITH THE LAND? CARVING 
OUT A CHANGING LANDSCAPE TO SECTION 162.09(3), FLORIDA 
STATUTES, WITH ENACTMENT OF SECTION 723.024, FLORIDA 
STATUTES, MOBILE HOME PARK LOT TENANCIES 
Harry M. Hipler* 
This article raises questions about the possible interpretations of section 723.024 
of the Florida Statutes as they pertain to code enforcement violations and procedures 
against mobile home park owners and mobile home owners in mobile home park lot 
tenancies. Ever since the enactment of section 162.09(3) in the 1980s, the 
fundamental principle has been that code enforcement violations and liens run with 
the land. After section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes became effective on June 2, 
2011, the question became whether the legislature has carved out an exception for 
mobile home park lot tenancies to bifurcate responsibility between mobile home 
owners and mobile home park owners. Literally, section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes says that each of these parties has their own responsibility in mobile home 
park lot tenancies, which is a reversal of approximately thirty years of law and 
procedure. Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is deceptively simple, as there are 
inconsistencies and contradictions contained within this statute. The wording of 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes undermines long-standing agency and strict 
liability principles as to code enforcement law and procedure. Section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes arguably removes agency and strict liability from section 162.09(3) 
of the Florida Statutes as it pertains to mobile home park lot tenancies according to 
some legal sources. By enacting what some have suggested is a major exception to 
a fundamental paradigm in code enforcement proceedings as applied to mobile home 
park lot tenancies, the legislature appears to have involved itself in reshaping code 
enforcement procedure and placed itself into the dynamics of mobile home park 
owners and mobile home owners’ responsibilities in code enforcement procedure.   
There are questions that remain after enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes. Is the statute’s wording clear and unambiguous? Does this statute conflict 
with the separation of powers doctrine in article I, section 3 of the Florida 
Constitution? What effect does the preemption doctrine in article VIII, section 2(b) 
of the Florida Constitution have on section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and local 
government code provisions? Does section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes provide 
procedural pitfalls and barriers in light of the access to courts provision of article I, 
section 21 of the Florida Constitution? Is enforcement of the statute mandatory or 
discretionary? Can section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes be construed together and 
reconciled with section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes? Is there a legal duty by 
mobile home park owners to report mobile home owners to local governments if 
there appears to be a code violation? Can a local government charge both parties 
under civil conspiracy and/or as an accomplice if mobile home park owners knew or 
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should have known that code violations existed, and neither did anything to report 
and correct code violations? In light of the different interpretations that can be given 
to section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the constitutional questions that have 
been raised in this article, can local governments decide for themselves how to 
construe and enforce the statute from one local government to another, thereby 
causing confusion and a lack of uniformity in local governments’ code enforcement 
prosecutions depending on what one local government may believe as distinguished 
from another local government?   
Until there is a better understanding of the impact and ultimate construction of 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, and whether section 162.09(3) of the Florida 
Statutes still controls, we will have to wait and see.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Florida law has held that code violations and liens “run with the land.”1 This 
paradigm has existed since the enactment of Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes in 
1980,2 and has continued to remain intact pursuant to Chapter 162 of the Florida 
Statutes.3 Current real property owners have been held responsible for bringing their 
real property into compliance with local governments’ (counties and municipalities) 
code regulations4 and have been subject to the payment of liens, interest, attorney 
fees, and costs if land owners fail to comply with code violations.5 Chapter 162 of 
the Florida Statutes grants local governments the power to enforce code provisions 
against owners of real property where violations exist.6 Imposing administrative 
fines on a per diem basis is permitted until the real property owner remedies the 
violations on his or her land and complies with all code enforcement orders.7 Chapter 
162 of the Florida Statutes also recognizes that both real property owners and 
someone other than real property owners may be responsible for violations of local 
 ________________________  
 * Harry M Hipler. Attorney, Dania Beach, Florida. M.A., Political Science, Florida International 
University, 2013; M.U.R.P., Florida Atlantic University, 2007; LL.M, Tax, University of Miami, 1981; J.D., 
University of Florida, 1975. “AV” Rated – Martindale Hubbell Law Directory. The author practices primarily in the 
areas of commercial litigation, local government law, and domestic relations. He has authored articles in the areas 
of local government law, urban and regional planning, and domestic relations.  
 1. Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines 
Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So. 
2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).  
 2. FLA. STAT. § 166.059 (1980); see id. §§ 166.051–166.062. “Violator” may include real property owner 
or non-real property owner depending on the underlying ordinance. See Op. Att’y Gen. Fla., infra note 107. 
 3. See FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–162.13, 162.21–162.30 (2016). More particularly, see FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3).  
 4. See id. § 162.06(5) (requiring the owner of property subject to an enforcement proceeding to disclose the 
existence and the nature of the proceeding to any prospective transferee and to disclose in writing to the prospective 
transferee that the new owner will be responsible for compliance with the applicable code and with orders issued in 
the code enforcement proceeding).  
 5. Id. §§ 162.06(5), 162.10.  
 6. See id. §§ 162.02, 162.03(2) (local governments are authorized to hold hearings and assess fines); Verdi 
v. Metro. Dade Cty., 684 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. No. 2001–77 (2001), 2001 
WL 1347157, http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/48D41C6174E2007385256AF500729DE2. 
 7. FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (A certified copy of order imposing a fine once recorded constitutes a lien against 
the land on which violation exists and upon any other real and personal property owned by the violator); id. § 162.10 
(the duration of lien is no more than twenty years after certified copy of order imposing fine and lien is recorded). 
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government code provisions, for the act states that both the “violator” and “the owner 
of property that is subject to an enforcement proceeding” are responsible for code 
violations under the provisions of Part I, Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes.8   
Mobile homes are an important aspect of the housing market in Florida, and most 
mobile homes are located in mobile home parks.9 This has occurred predominantly 
on account of the high cost of owning land,10 the impact of zoning ordinances that 
frequently restrict placement of mobile homes in mobile home parks,11 and reliance 
on a belief that mobile homes are an inexpensive and durable form of housing.12 
When section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes became effective on June 2, 2011, the 
legislature involved itself in attempting to reshape code enforcement procedure by 
placing itself into the dynamics between mobile home park owners and mobile home 
owners’ responsibilities in code enforcement violations and liens.13 Section 723.024 
of the Florida Statutes has attempted to separate responsibility between mobile home 
park owners and mobile home owners. In so doing, the legislature has attempted to 
lessen the impact of the fundamental paradigm existing in code enforcement 
proceedings since the 1980s that code violations and liens run with the land.14 
This article focuses on section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and its interplay 
with Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, more particularly section 162.09(3) of the 
Florida Statutes concerning enforcement and compliance of code violations. Section 
723.024 of the Florida Statutes provides local governments with authority to enforce 
its code provisions against non-owners of real property (mobile home owners) whose 
acts have resulted in violations in mobile home park lot tenancies, rather than 
following the fundamental principle in Florida code enforcement law that code 
 ________________________  
 8. Id. §§ 162.06(2), (5).  
 9. See Stephen Schreiber, Mobile Homes and Hurricanes: The Crisis in Florida, ACSA INT’L CONF. 39, 
41 (2005); Esther Sullivan, Halfway Homeowners: Eviction and Forced Relocation in a Florida Manufactured 
Home Park, 39 LAW SOC. INQUIRY 474, 475 (2014). In Florida, there are approximately 7,302,947 total housing 
units, and of that number there are 849,304 mobile homes that make up 11.6 percent of the total housing units. 
Historical Census of Housing Tables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (October 31, 2011), 
https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/units.html.  
 10. Morris A. Davis & Michael G. Palumbo, The Price of Residential Land in Large U.S. Cities, 63 J. URB. 
ECON. 352, 353, 361, 367 (2008); Richard Williams et al., The Changing Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage 
Lending, 52 SOC. PROBS. 181, 189–90 (2005); see also Rachel E. Dwyer, Expanding Homes and Increasing 
Inequalities: U.S. Housing Development and the Residential Segregation of the Affluent, 54 SOC. PROBS. 23, 43 
(2007) (discussing how manufactured homes are sought out by lower income families, as opposed to the more 
affluent). 
 11. Daniel R. Mandelker, Zoning Barriers to Manufactured Housing, 48 URB. L. 233, 236–37, 244–45 
(2016); Julia O. Beamish et al., Not a Trailer Anymore: Perceptions of Manufactured Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y 
DEBATE 373, 377–78 (2001); Casey J. Dawkins & C. Theodore Koebel, Overcoming Barriers to Placing 
Manufactured Housing in Metropolitan Communities, 76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 73, 76 (2009); David Ray Papke, 
Keeping the Underclass in Its Place: Zoning, the Poor, and Residential Segregation, 41 URB. L. 787, 797 (2009); 
see G. Shen, Location of Manufactured Housing and Its Accessibility to Community Services: A GIS-Assisted Spatial 
Analysis, 39 SOC. ECON. PLAN. SCI. 25, 26 (2005). 
 12. Thomas P. Boehm & Alan Schlottman, Is Manufactured Housing a Good Alternative for Low Income 
Households? Evidence from the American Housing Survey, 10 CITYSCAPE 159, 169 (2008); Beamish, supra note 
11, at 377; Dawkins, supra note 11, at 74; see Richard Genz, Why Advocates Need to Rethink Manufactured 
Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 393, 396–97 (2001). 
 13. See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2011); S. 650, 2011 Leg. (Fla. 2011). 
 14. Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines 
Assoc., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So. 2d 
1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); see FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).   
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violations and liens run with the land applicable since the inception of Chapter 166 
of the Florida Statutes and its successor Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes.15 This 
article also discusses conflicting provisions within section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes that may subject the statute to varying interpretations in light of its wording 
and relevant case law, which calls into question whether section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes is constitutionally deficient under the separation of powers doctrine 
of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the preemption doctrine of 
article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution. Finally, in light of the tensions 
existing between section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and section 162.09(3) of the 
Florida Statutes, options about construction of these statutes and their interplay are 
discussed for future consideration that will allow the reader to determine which 
options fit best in light of the relevant case law and long term implications for code 
enforcement law and procedure.   
II. MOBILE HOME OWNERS OR MOBILE HOME PARK OWNERS: WHO IS THE 
“RESPONSIBLE PARTY” ACCORDING TO SECTION 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA 
STATUTES? 
On June 2, 2011, section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes16 became effective, and 
it was intended to help mobile home owners and mobile home park owners determine 
which party has responsibility to maintain compliance with local government code 
provisions.17 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes18 appears to have been created 
to allow local governments to enforce code violations against mobile home owners 
or mobile home park owners, subject to the criteria listed in sections 723.02219 and 
723.023 of the Florida Statutes.20  
 ________________________  
 15. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see FLA. STAT. §§ 166.051–.062 (1980); FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–.13 (1985). 
 16. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2011) (s. 1, ch. 201–105); S. 650, 2011 Leg. (Fla. 2011).  
 17. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2011) (“Compliance by mobile home park owners and mobile home owners. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or of any local law, ordinance, or code: (1) If a unit of local 
government finds that a violation of a local code or ordinance has occurred, the unit of local government shall cite 
the responsible party for the violation and enforce the citation under its local code and ordinance enforcement 
authority. (2) A lien, penalty, fine, or other administrative or civil proceeding may not be brought against a mobile 
home owner or mobile home for any duty or responsibility of the mobile home park owner under [§] 723.022 or 
against a mobile home park owner or mobile home park property for any duty or responsibility of the mobile home 
owner under [§] 723.023.”). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 723.022 (2016). (“Mobile home park owner’s general obligations—A mobile home 
park owner shall at all times: (1) Comply with the requirements of applicable building, housing, and health codes. 
(2) Maintain buildings and improvements in common areas in a good state of repair and maintenance and maintain 
the common areas in a good state of appearance, safety, and cleanliness. (3) Provide access to the common areas, 
including buildings and improvements thereto, at all reasonable times for the benefit of the park residents and their 
guests. (4) Maintain utility connections and systems for which the park owner is responsible in proper operating 
condition. (5) Comply with properly promulgated park rules and regulations and require other persons on the 
premises with his or her consent to comply therewith and conduct themselves in a manner that does not unreasonably 
disturb the park residents or constitute a breach of the peace.”). 
 20. FLA. STAT. § 723.023 (2016) (“Mobile home owner’s general obligations—A mobile home owner shall 
at all times: (1) Comply with all obligations imposed on mobile home owners by applicable provisions of building, 
housing, and health codes, including compliance with all building permits and construction requirements for 
construction on the mobile home and lot. The home owner is responsible for all fines imposed by the local 
government for noncompliance with any local codes. (2) Keep the mobile home lot which he or she occupies clean, 
neat, and sanitary, and maintained in compliance with all local codes. (3) Comply with properly promulgated park 
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The legislature has specifically defined “Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies” in 
section 723.002(1) of the Florida Statutes as follows: “The provisions of [Chapter 
723 Mobile Home Park Lot Tenancies] apply to any residential tenancy in which a 
mobile home is placed upon a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park in which 
10 or more lots are offered for rent or lease.”21 If a mobile home park falls within the 
ambit of section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes it appears that either the mobile 
home owner or the mobile home park owner may be charged and ultimately held 
responsible for code violations, as provided in sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the 
Florida Statutes.22 These statutes attempt to enumerate the circumstances where a 
party may be responsible,23 and along with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,24 
make it statutorily prohibited for a local government to charge and adjudicate one 
party when the other may be responsible.25 
If a mobile home owner does not comply with local government codes on real 
property leased from the mobile home park owner, the local government may no 
longer be able to charge and adjudicate a fine and a lien against the mobile home 
park owner.26 Sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes27 have 
sought to describe the circumstances under which a local government may charge 
the responsible party, whether it is the mobile home owner or a mobile home park 
owner.28 One common situation that is set forth in section 723.023(1) of the Florida 
Statutes concerns the undertaking by a mobile home owner who violates a local 
government building code by adding an attachment built onto the existing unit 
without a building permit.29 Under those circumstances, section 723.023(1) of the 
Florida Statutes provides that it is the mobile home owner that is responsible for all 
fines and liens imposed by the local government, as the act makes it the mobile home 
owner’s responsibility as lessee of the land to obtain “compliance with all building 
permits and construction requirements for construction on the mobile home and 
lot.”30 After enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, the long-standing 
 ________________________  
rules and regulations and require other persons on the premises with his or her consent to comply with such rules 
and to conduct themselves, and other persons on the premises with his or her consent, in a manner that does not 
unreasonably disturb other residents of the park or constitute a breach of the peace.”).  
 21. Id. § 723.002(1); Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d 61, 62–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994); Rowles v. Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 585 So. 2d 319, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 22. Section 723.024 uses the word “may,” and therefore an argument is that “may” is discretionary with a 
local government as to whether a party can be charged, leaving open the possibility that a local government retains 
discretionary authority to decide which party is responsible that will still provide a local government to decide which 
party, or both, should be charged. On account of the statute’s use of “may” and “shall,” a local government may 
retain the discretion to file a single charge against one party, or a joint charge against both. See discussions infra 
Parts VI and X. 
 23. See Pappert v. Mobilinium Assoc., 512 So. 2d 1096, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 24. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). 
 25. Id. §§ 723.022–723.024. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. § 723.024. 
 29. Id. § 723.023(1); see Gem Estates Mobile Home Vill. Ass’n, Inc. v. Bluhm, 885 So. 2d 435, 436, 439–
40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding where the mobile home owner attached an enclosed screen porch in violation 
of a recorded restriction applicable to each mobile home while the decision concerned the enforceability of a 
restriction, the setback requirement falls within the ambit of section 723.023 subsection 1 of the Florida Statutes and 
potential violations imposed by local government code provisions). 
 30. FLA. STAT. § 723.023(1). 
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rule that the real property owner, not the tenant, was ultimately responsible for code 
violations31 may not apply to mobile home park owners as defined in section 
723.002(1) of the Florida Statutes32 on account of what may be a bifurcation of 
responsibility pursuant to sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes.33   
III. HISTORY OF CHAPTER 162 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES 
In 1980, the Florida legislature enacted Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes34 that 
later became Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes,35 which currently outlines code 
enforcement procedures.36 “The idea was to take the enforcement of local ordinances 
out of the overloaded courts [by having] violations handled in [administrative 
proceedings] by local citizen boards.”37 That idea was later amended to include 
special magistrates after considering evidence of code compliance officers and 
respondents.38 Before 1980, a local government could find a tenant responsible for 
local government code violations if the real property owner was not engaged in or 
operating a business on the real property.39 After the enactment of Chapter 166 of 
the Florida Statutes in 1980,40 it was the owner’s real property, where the code 
violations existed, that was ultimately responsible for local government code 
violations after a certified copy of an order was recorded.41 By 1985, former Chapter 
166 had become Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes,42 and section 162.09 of the 
Florida Statutes read that a certified copy of an order would constitute a lien against 
the land on which the violation exists, “or if the violator does not own the land, upon 
any other real or personal property owned by the violator.”43 The next material 
change occurred by 1987 with an amendment of section 162.09(3) of the Florida 
Statutes, where a recorded certified copy of the order would “constitute a lien against 
 ________________________  
 31. See id. §§ 723.023(1), 162.09(3). 
 32. Id. § 723.002(1).  
 33. See id. §§ 723.022–723.024.   
 34. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.051–166.062 (1980). 
 35. FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–162.13 (1985).   
 36. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06–162.07, 162.09–162.10 (2016). 
 37. Guide to Code Enforcement in St. Johns County Government, ST. JOHNS COUNTY GOV’T, 
http://www.co.st-johns.fl.us/CodeEnforcement/guide.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2016). “The idea was to take the 
enforcement of local ordinances out of the state court system and have violations handled by local Code Compliance 
Inspectors. This law also allowed municipalities to establish an administrative process.” Code Compliance 
Homeowner’s Guide, CITY OF PUNTA GORDA, http://www.ci.punta-gorda.fl.us/home/showdocument?id=1068 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2016) (“[E]ducation of the public can be [an] effective tool that Code Enforcement officials have 
at their disposal.”) 
 38. See FLA. STAT. § 162.03(2) (2016).   
 39. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 382 So. 2d 316, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); City 
of Miami v. Schonfeld, 197 So. 2d 559, 560–61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). The same parties were before the appellate 
court on a previous occasion in City of Miami v. Schonfeld, 132 So.2d 767, 768–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961), 
involving the interpretation of the city ordinance then in effect.   
 40. FLA. STAT. §§ 166.051–166.062 (1980).   
 41. Id. § 166.059 (“A certified copy of an order imposing a fine may be recorded in the public records and 
thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists.”). 
 42. FLA. STAT. §§ 162.01–162.13 (1985). 
 43. Id. § 162.09(3).  
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the land on which the violation exists and upon any other real or personal property 
owned by the violator.”44   
As local government code compliance departments grew, it was common for 
mobile home park owners and mobile home owners to violate local code provisions; 
both would stay silent out of fear that a mobile home park owner would be per se 
responsible, making it difficult for code enforcement officials to find code violations 
on real property of all types in local governments.45 Many code violations have been 
and are continually being corrected from day to day, but there remain countless 
numbers of violations in mobile home park lot tenancies and elsewhere in local 
communities.46    
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF AGENCY AND STRICT LIABILITY TO CHAPTER 162 OF 
THE FLORIDA STATUTES 
Why did the legislature make the owner of real property ultimately responsible 
for code violations pursuant to Chapter 166 and Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes? 
By delegating code enforcement to local government quasi-judicial proceedings, 
these statutes brought forward a legislative purpose, which was to provide an 
expeditious and economically efficient method to obtain code compliance that would 
also deter future code violations by current and future owners and violators.47 
Otherwise, if fault and cause had to be shown by local governments, protracted and 
drawn out proceedings would occur that would result in highly divisive and costly 
disputes between a local government, the owner of real property, and the tenant on 
the question of who was the responsible party.48   
 ________________________  
 44. FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987). 
 45. See Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); 
Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Omari Ben-Shahar et al., 
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650–63 (2011). 
 46. See Kermit J. Lind, Collateral Matters: Housing Code Compliance in the Mortgage Crisis, 32 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 445, 455–56 (2012); Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The Forgotten First 
Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2009); Ezra Rosser, Rural 
Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POL’Y 33, 37–39 
(2006); Keith H. Hirokawa & Ira Gonzalez, Regulating Vacant Property, 42 URBAN LAWYER 627, 632 (2010); but 
see Lea Deutsch, Collateral Damage: Mitigating the Effects of Foreclosure in Communities, 22 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 203, 212 (2012). 
 47. FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016); see Raymond J. Burby et al., Improving Compliance with Regulations: 
Choices and Outcomes for Local Government, 64 J. ON AMERICAN PLAN. ASS’N, 1, 8 (1998);  Margaret L. Smith, 
No Property Left Behind: An Exploration of Abandoned Property Policies, 31–33 (2014) (unpublished Masters 
thesis, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Scholarly Commons); Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of 
Laws on Lead-Based Paint: From Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S. C. L. REV. 511, 545 (1994) 
(discussing purposes of a specific federal law, which include cost-effective means of fulfilling the law); Arun S. 
Malik, Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution, 24 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT., 
241, 254 (1993). 
 48. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (permitting the legislature to grant to “administrative officers or bodies” 
“quasi-judicial power in matters connected with the functions of their offices.”); Verdi v. Metro. Dade Cty., 684 So. 
2d 870, 874–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that, pursuant to Article V, § 1, of the state constitution, Dade 
County, “as a legislative body[,] would have clear authority to utilize hearing officers to enforce its codes as long as 
such enforcement proceedings are only quasi-judicial in nature.”); Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows 
of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 
702 (2002).  
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One may look to agency theory49 and the strict liability doctrine50 in determining 
that the owner of real property is ultimately responsible for code violations, and that 
is what section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes did by making the owner responsible 
upon adjudication, regardless of who caused the code violations or who was at 
fault.51 The legislative authority for imposing agency or strict liability on real 
property owners flows from section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes,52 and it 
provides: “an order imposing a fine . . . may be recorded in the public records, and 
thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and 
upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator.”53 A literal reading 
of section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes54 supports the conclusion that the 
recording of a certified copy of a code enforcement order constitutes a lien against 
the land on which the violation exists and upon all real and personal property of the 
owner regardless of fault and who caused the code violations.55 
V. SECTION 723.024 AS APPLIED TO SECTION 162.09(3) OF THE FLORIDA 
STATUTES: CONCEPTS OF REPORTING, SELF-REPORTING, AND THIRD PARTY 
REPORTING OF CODE VIOLATIONS 
What is the legislative goal of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes? According 
to a literal reading of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, a mobile home park 
owner may now be able to contact a local government without fear of reprisal by the 
local government that it will charge a mobile home park owner with code violations 
caused by the mobile home owner.56 If a code violation of a mobile home is reported, 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may alleviate fears of a mobile home park 
owner that he or she will not be responsible for code violations resulting from action 
 ________________________  
 49. The purpose of agency law is to restore the status quo after a person chooses to use an agent. In an agency 
relationship, one party acts on behalf of another. The foundational principle of agency law is that the principal, who 
has chosen to carry out his or her business through an agent, must bear the foreseeable consequences created by that 
choice. As the bearer of rewards and risks, the principal is entitled to receive the benefits created by the agency 
relationship (rent from a tenant), as well as the burdens created by the agency relationship (wrongdoing by the tenant 
that is imputed and attributed onto the principal). This set of principles can be called cost benefit internalization 
theory, and generally explains agency law doctrine. See Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 495, 498 (2011); Susan P. Shapiro, Agency Theory, 31 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 263, 263 (2005); H. Ross, Housing 
Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 6, 29 (1996). 
 50. See Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD., 205, 205–06 (1973); Jed 
Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. 
Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 333–35 (2000); Saul Levmore, Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict 
Liability, and Mitigation in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2009). 
 51. See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 162.09(3) (2016) (“A certified copy of an order imposing a fine, or a fine plus repair costs, may be 
recorded in the public records and thereafter shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and 
upon any other real or personal property owned by the violator. Upon petition to the circuit court, such order shall 
be enforceable in the same manner as a court judgment by the sheriffs of this state, including execution and levy 
against the personal property of the violator, but such order shall not be deemed to be a court judgment except for 
enforcement purposes.”); see City of Boynton Beach v. Janots, 101 So. 3d 864, 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Jones 
v. City of Winter Haven, 870 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 56. See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). 
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or inaction of a mobile home owner.57 If a local government decides to charge a non-
compliant mobile home owner based upon the evidence and sections 723.022, 
723.023, and 732.024 of the Florida Statutes, it may be the mobile home owner, 
rather than the mobile home park owner, that will be responsible for any fines and 
liens that may be assessed upon non-compliance, according to one interpretation that 
is discussed in this article and elsewhere by legal practitioners.58   
Before the enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,59 a mobile home 
park owner was strictly responsible for code violations resulting from a mobile home 
owner’s violations of local government provisions, and that process was consistent 
with section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes that made the owner of real property 
ultimately responsible whether it was the owner, a tenant, or an unknown third party 
that may have caused code violations.60 From the inception of the code enforcement 
legislation in the1980s, it was not always in the best interest of a mobile home park 
owner to contact a local government code enforcement department about tenants’ 
violations, because the mobile home park owner was ultimately responsible for code 
violations resulting from the mobile home owner.61   
As the party who was ultimately responsible for correcting any violations, before 
June 2, 2011, the mobile home park owner had to comply with final orders or be 
subject to an assessment of fines and liens levied by the local government according 
to Section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes.62 The strict responsibility that resulted 
from Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes was further exacerbated by the fact that 
mobile home park owners were subject to the discretion of local governments’ 
boards and special magistrates, even if the code violation was due to the acts of a 
mobile home owner.63 Once code enforcement claims were adjudicated, the mobile 
home park owner was ultimately responsible and subject to fines and liens, and 
depending on how much time it took to obtain compliance by the mobile home owner 
or rid the violator from residing in the mobile home park, the fines and liens could 
escalate if compliance with the final order did not occur by a certain date.64 It was 
possible that the uncapped fines imposed on a mobile home park owner could be 
allowed to accrue until there was compliance with the final order that was entered 
 ________________________  
 57. Id. § 723.024(2). 
 58. See Scott Gordon, New Law May Help Manufactured Housing ROCs Deal with Code Violations, FLA. 
ROC (June 23, 2011), http://www.floridaroc.com/2011/06/articles/news-of-note-for-rocs/new-law-may-help-
manufactured-housing-rocs-deal-with-code-violations/; Florida Statute 723.024, THE RICHARDSON LAW GROUP 
(June 23, 2011), http://www.richardslawgroup.com/rlg/florida-statute-723-024/. These commentaries were written 
shortly after enactment of the statute by private lawyers, but they do not discuss or raise the questions made in this 
article. Only time will tell how section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes will be construed. 
 59. FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (2016). 
 60. See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 874 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that “code violations ‘run with the land’ and subsequent purchasers can be held 
responsible for bringing their property up to code”). 
 61. See Wilson v. Cty. of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625, 627–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) for an example of how 
things can go from bad to worse for a mobile home park owner and a mobile home owner. 
 62. See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (1987). 
 63. Id.; see also Monroe Cty., 697 So. 2d at 874; Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2008); City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So. 2d 1148, 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
 64. See Broward Cty v. Recupero, 949 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Jones v. City of Winter 
Haven, 870 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Moustakis v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, No. 08–60124, 2008 WL 
2222101, at *1 (S.D.Fla. 2008), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 820 (11th Cir. 2009).   
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against the mobile home park.65 Even after compliance occurred on the subject real 
property, liens entered against a mobile home park owner might be difficult to reduce 
through local government administrative procedures, and even if they were mitigated 
or abated, the mobile home park owner was still responsible to pay whatever amount 
the lien was reduced, pursuant to an abatement or mitigation proceeding.66   
An option open to mobile home park owners before enactment of section 
723.024 of the Florida Statutes was for a mobile home park owner to file an eviction 
action pursuant to section 723.061 of the Florida Statutes67 and/or for removal of 
mobile home owner/tenant, pursuant to section 723.062 of the Florida Statutes,68 if 
the mobile home owner failed to comply with local government code provisions.69 
By attempting to remove the violator from the mobile home park, the owner of the 
mobile home park showed a good faith effort to rid the violator from the land, and 
after doing so, the mobile home park owner could move toward obtaining 
compliance with existing code violations after the mobile home owner was 
removed.70 There was no guarantee that the local government would extend a 
compliance date based upon a mobile home park owner’s good faith efforts to correct 
violations to obtain compliance, but this was a method to show a good faith attempt 
to obtain compliance by attempting to remove the tenant.71 
Can it be argued that sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes72 favor the mobile home park owner or the mobile home owner?73 These 
statutes attempt to set forth responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile 
home park owners.74 Still, it is hard to imagine a situation where a mobile home park 
owner and mobile home owner are on an equal footing and bargaining position—
whether it be for the payment of rent, removal of a mobile home, or maintenance of 
their respective property—because the mobile home park owner owns and runs the 
park and has a great deal of control over the rules and regulations in its park, subject 
to compliance with Chapter 723 of the Florida Statutes.75 It takes time for a mobile 
 ________________________  
 65. See FLA. STAT. 162.09(3) (2016); Jones, 870 So. 2d at 54; Fong v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 864 So. 
2d 76, 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Cty. Collection Services, Inc. v. Allen, 650 So. 2d 650, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995). 
 66. FLA. STAT. § 162.09(2)(c) (2016) (providing that a code enforcement board or special magistrate may 
reduce a code enforcement fine before the order imposing such fine has been recorded); City of Miami v. Cortex, 
995 So. 2d 604, 605 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. No. 2002-62 (2002), 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/80125F88720EF64485256C3100570ABC; Op. Att’y Gen. Fla., 
No. 99-03 (1999), http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/4988FF55164E531D852566FF00564FE1. 
 67. FLA. STAT. § 723.061(1)(b) (2016).  
 68. Id. §§ 723.061(1)(b), 723.062.   
 69. See Wilson v. Cty. of Orange, 881 So. 2d 625, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 70. See id. at 627; see FLA. STAT. §§ 723.061–723.062 (2016). In its aftermath, we can only hope that the 
local government, in its actions, considered its actions as improper if the allegations made by the mobile home park 
owner proved to be true and correct.  
 71. See FLA. STAT. § 162.09 (2)(b) (2016) (“In determining the amount of the fine, if any, the enforcement 
board shall consider . . . [a]ny actions taken by the violator to correct the violation.”).  
 72. Id. §§ 723.022–723.024.   
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See FLA. STAT. § 723.037 for rules and procedure changes. See also Sun Valley Homeowners, Inc. v. 
American Land Lease, Inc., 927 So. 2d 259, 263–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Homeowners Corp. of River Trails 
v. Saba, 626 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Connelly v. Old Bridge Village Co-Op, Inc., 915 So. 2d 
652, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). The relationship between mobile home parks and mobile home owners is replete 
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home owner to remove himself or herself from a mobile home park, and if removal 
occurs, where does the mobile home owner go? When a mobile home owner 
transfers and sells his or her home to a third party, the successor owner will take the 
mobile home “as is,” which could include code violations existing on the mobile 
home that may make the successor responsible for code violations the owner had no 
way of knowing existed, but that the mobile home park knew existed.76 By removing 
agency and strict liability from the responsibility of mobile home park owners, long-
standing code violations existing on a mobile home could become the responsibility 
of a successor mobile home owner.77 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may 
also constitute a method of reallocation in private funding regarding financial 
responsibility between mobile home owners, who are less able to correct code 
violations, and mobile home park owners, who may now be in a better position to 
escape responsibility for acts they knew or should have known existed on their land 
but did nothing to escape responsibility in the past.78  
In a tug-of-war as to financial responsibility, which party will have greater power 
and be in a superior position to face and accept or escape responsibility?79 The 
legislature has attempted to bifurcate responsibility in sections 723.022, 723.023, 
and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes in what was deemed to be an equitable manner, 
and the mobile home owner is left with the responsibility of complying with any 
code violations on the purchased mobile home whether he or she had anything to do 
with the code violations, while the mobile home park owner escapes responsibility 
and may be free to report code violations without fear of reprisal by the local 
government.80        
On a positive note, there is a common thread and interest that mobile home park 
owners and mobile home owners may share by enactment of section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes. By making both responsible for designated code violations, this 
statute may ensure that their respective surroundings in a mobile home park can be 
 ________________________  
with complexities in property interests and responsibilities. Mobile home owners as tenants in mobile home parks 
own their homes, but they usually lease the land from the park. Some can be situated on unplaited lots as existed in 
Connelly. The land each home owner leased in a ninety-nine-year lease involved uncertainty between two mobile 
home owners and the park where the district court discussed the uncertainty that can arise concerning the boundaries 
and rights that various lot holders may exercise over their property during tenancies. See generally Chapter 723 of 
the Florida Statutes, which addressed mobile home lot tenancies. 
 76. See Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) for 
a demonstration of the power and the patience of one local government involving the character of a campground 
that had changed for residents who built permanent structures and what became mobile homes, which did not comply 
with the local government’s zoning restrictions making code enforcement proceedings a viable alternative. The real 
property was originally zoned as a Recreational Vehicle District where permanent structures were not allowed. Key 
Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. was litigated before enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, but sets 
forth an example where mobile home owners and a mobile home park were both responsible for the change in use 
resulting in code violations that were at odds with the existing zoning regulations.   
 77. Id. 
 78. Candace Myers et al., Social Vulnerability and Migration in the Wake of Disaster: The Case of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 29 POPULATION AND ENV’T 27, 274 (2008); see Richard Williams et al., The Changing 
Face of Inequality in Home Mortgage Lending, 52 SOC. PROBLEMS, 181, 190 (2005); Katherine MacTavish et al., 
Housing Vulnerability Among Rural Trailer-Park Households, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 95, 96 (2006). 
 79. See FLA. STAT. § 723.24 (2016); Pilgrim v. Crescent Lake Mobile Colony, Inc., 582 So. 2d 649, 651–52 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 80. No argument is made that section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is unconscionable because that would 
be nearly impossible to demonstrate. See Belcher v. Kier, 558 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
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jointly maintained in accordance with local governments’ code provisions.81 
Whatever the consequences of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, whether code 
violations are the responsibility of a mobile home owner or a mobile home park 
owner, both should be respectful of the policy of Chapter 162 that emphasizes its 
intention to “promote, protect, and improve the health, safety, and welfare of the 
citizens of the counties and municipalities of this state.”82 While local governments 
have jurisdiction to enforce code violations pursuant to Chapter 162 of the Florida 
Statutes, we can return to the chapter’s fundamental goal: to make the public 
recognize that by maintaining high quality business and residential neighborhoods 
that are compliant with local governments’ code provisions, the health, safety, and 
welfare of the community will be kept intact.83 That objective should also enhance 
the quality of life of a neighborhood’s residents and business owners, which will 
ensure an increase in local governments’ taxes as the real property gradually 
increases in value, and that should help support local governments’ services.84   
By making each party responsible for designated violations that are listed in 
sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes,85 each party is 
required to keep its own surroundings free and clear of code violations without 
imposing agency or strict liability onto the mobile home park owner by acts of a 
mobile home owner that occur after June 2, 2011.86 Thus, a mobile home owner is 
responsible for some designated matters, whereas mobile home park owners are 
responsible for other designated matters.87 That is at least one interpretation of 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes before any judicial construction of the statute. 
Yet this interpretation cannot rule out the possibility that both might be responsible 
based on the facts and circumstances of a case.88 
 ________________________  
 81. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.023 (2016). In a decision before the enactment of Chapter 162, the appellate 
court stated: “The owner and the tenants of a mobile home park have a common interest in a guarantee that their 
surroundings will be pleasant and maintained according to a certain standard.” Blair v. Mobile Home Cmtys., Inc., 
345 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
 82. FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016). 
 83. Id.   
 84. Id.; Harry M. Hipler, Developments in the Law on Local Government Code Enforcement Proceedings: 
Quasi-Judicial Proceedings Pursuant to Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, 42 STETSON L. REV. 681, 682–83 (2013); 
Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 33, 80 (2006); Joseph Schilling, Code Enforcement and Community Stabilization: The 
Forgotten First Responders to Vacant and Foreclosed Homes, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 149 (2009); see also 
Raymond J. Burby, et al., Building Code Enforcement Burdens and Central City Decline, 66 J. OF AMERICAN 
PLANN. ASS’N 143, 144 (2000); see generally Kyle McCollum, Top Ten Building Code Violations in Florida, 3, 36 
(2004) (unpublished thesis, University of Florida) (on file with the George A. Smathers Libraries, University of 
Florida). 
 85. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.024 (2016). 
 86. Id. §§ 162.09(3), 723.024. 
 87. See id. §§ 723.022–723.024; Pappert v. Mobilinium Assocs. V, 512 So. 2d 1096, 1097–98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1987) (outlining duties of mobile park owners); see Pilgrim v. Crescent Lake Mobile Colony, 582 So. 2d 649, 
651–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
 88. See discussion infra Parts IX–XI.; see also David T. Kraut, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: 
Eliminating the Blight of Vacant Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1139 (1999). 
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VI. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS AND QUESTIONS ABOUT SECTION 
723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES 
The enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes raises questions about 
its enforceability. First, does the local government retain discretion to decide which 
party is responsible, or is the local government required to follow sections 723.022, 
723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes? Second, assuming that a mobile home 
is personal property (as long as it is not permanently attached to the land), how is a 
local government to obtain in rem jurisdiction and service so that a mobile home 
owner can be charged with code violations? Third, is there a duty upon a mobile 
home park owner to report a violator to the local government after enactment of 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes if it becomes aware of code violations 
resulting from the action or inaction of a mobile home owner? Finally, what if a 
mobile home park owner fails to report a code violation by ignoring a mobile home 
owner’s violations—can there be any civil or code enforcement repercussions 
against the mobile home park owner?   
Before enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, agency and strict 
liability applied in making a mobile home park owner ultimately responsible for any 
code violations resulting from acts of a mobile home owner.89 However, in what may 
be a newly created relationship after enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes,90 there is the possibility that sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes can be construed to create a new partnership and agency relationship 
that bifurcates responsibility between mobile home park owners and mobile home 
owners.91 This means that the legislature may have removed agency and strict 
liability from section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes as applied to mobile home 
park lot tenancies.92 It is premature to conclude that agency and strict liability have 
been completely removed on account of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, as 
it is necessary to look at the wording of this statute that suggests that there are 
problematic inconsistencies and contradictions within this statute that need to be 
resolved.   
A. Section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes Uses “Shall” and Section 
723.024(2) Uses “May” So Which Is It? 
Section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes provides that the local government 
“shall” charge the responsible party for the violation and enforce the citation under 
its local code enforcement authority.93 Yet section 723.024(2) of the Florida 
Statutes94 provides that an administrative or civil proceeding “may” not be brought 
against anyone other than the responsible party for the reasons outlined in section 
 ________________________  
 89. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 90. See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see Malik, supra note 47. 
 91. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.024 (2016). 
 92. See id. § 162.09(3); discussion supra Part IV. 
 93. FLA. STAT. § 723.024(1) (2016).  
 94. Id. § 723.024(2).   
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723.022 of the Florida Statutes (mobile home park owner)95 and section 723.023 of 
the Florida Statutes (mobile home owner).96 There is an apparent inconsistency 
within these statutes as one portion of section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes uses 
“shall” which is mandatory,97 whereas section 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes uses 
“may” which is discretionary.98 These inconsistencies raise a fundamental question: 
Does section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes make this provision mandatory, and 
does section 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes grant local governments’ discretion 
to decide who should be charged and what charges can be made?99   
While one can argue that the intent of the statute was to help mobile home park 
owners and mobile home owners determine which party is the responsible party,100 
the inconsistency within section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes might allow local 
governments to decide who to charge and what violations to charge a mobile home 
owner and mobile home park owner.101 It is too early to tell how section 723.024 of 
the Florida Statutes may be interpreted, so until there is a judicial interpretation of 
this statute,102 or an Attorney General’s opinion,103 the tension existing within section 
723.024 of the Florida Statutes, and between sections 723.024 and 162.09(3) of the 
Florida Statues, may be left to the discretionary authority of local governments.104 
This is so because judicial decisions have shown great deference to agency and local 
government rulings when faced with a problem of statutory construction, as they are 
best suited to know how local codes ought to be interpreted within their local 
bodies.105 If tension continues to exist, then section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes 
may be interpreted different ways by various local governments depending upon 
their local officials’ judgments.106 
 ________________________  
 95. Id. §§ 723.022, 724.024(2).   
 96. Id. § 723.023. 
 97. Id. § 723.024(1); Kaweblum v. Thornhill Est. Homeowner Ass’n Inc., 755 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla. 2000) 
(citing Chaky v. State, 651 So. 2d 1169, 1172 (Fla. 1995)). 
 98. FLA. STAT. § 723.024(2) (2016); Kaweblum, 755 So. 2d at 87 (citing Chaky, 651 So. 2d at 1172). 
 99. See Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 1999); City of Pinellas Park v. Brown, 604 So. 2d 
1222, 1227 (Fla. 1992); see also Milanese v. City of Boca Raton, 84 So. 3d 339, 343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) 
(While these cases discuss sovereign immunity, they also suggest that where a zone of risk is created by a third 
party, liability may extend to the parties which create a zone of risk.). 
 100. See discussion supra Part V. 
 101. See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); Kaweblum, 755 So. 2d at 87 (citing Chaky, 651 So.2d at 1172). 
 102. See generally Walton Cty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d 1102, 1109 (Fla. 2008) (discussing 
the de novo review of a lower court’s decision on the constitutionality of a statute). 
 103. Frequently Asked Questions About Atty. Gen. Opinions, ATT’Y GEN. FLA.,  
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/dd177569f8fb0f1a85256cc6007b70ad (last visited April 17, 2017) 
(explaining that on questions of statutory interpretation, the Attorney General can render a non-binding opinion that 
is only persuasive). 
 104. FLA. STAT. § 723.024(1) (2016). A compelling argument can be made that section 723.024(1) specifically 
says that the local government, “shall cite the responsible party for the violation and enforce the citation under its 
local code and ordinance enforcement authority.” Id. § 723.024(1). Since each local government has its own 
building, housing, and health codes and regulations, is it not the local government that is best suited to decide which 
party is responsible? See discussion infra Part VII; see also Panama City Beach Cmty. Redevelopment Agency v. 
State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037–38 (Fla. 2001). 
 105. See Samara Dev. Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Estuary Prop. Inc., 
399 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 1981). 
 106. See Samara Dev. Corp., 556 So. 2d at 1098; Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1379. 
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B. Establishing In Rem Jurisdiction Over Mobile Home Owners in Light 
of Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes 
Another issue with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is the question of 
notice and service upon a mobile home owner and whether in rem jurisdiction can 
be obtained in code enforcement proceedings. Since 1980, local governments have 
prosecuted code violations against the owners of real property in accordance with 
Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes.107  Section 166.062 of the Florida Statutes108 
formerly provided that: “[a]ll notices . . . shall be by certified mail, return receipt 
requested, or, when mail would not be effective, by hand delivery by the code 
inspector.”109 Its successor, section 162.12(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes,110 has 
provided for years that the violator will be provided with notice by hand delivery, or 
mailed by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address listed in the tax 
collector’s office for tax notices, or to the address listed in the county property 
appraiser’s database, or publication, or posting on the subject real property as 
provided in section 162.12(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.111 To make certain that 
adequate notice has been afforded to mobile home owners, local governments may 
also provide additional notice to any other address of a violator that is found for the 
property owner in addition to service by publication or posting on the subject of real 
property.112   
Assuming that mobile homes with code violations may be charged in lieu of 
mobile home park owners, with the enactment of section 723.024,113 the reader needs 
to be reminded that mobile homes constitute personal property, not land, and 
therefore mobile homes are subject to a license tax, unless the mobile home is 
permanently situated and affixed to the land, in which case they are part of the 
land.114 The question raised from this possible change in responsibility is that 
because mobile homes are personal property, how should mobile homes be noticed 
in order to comply with section 162.12 of the Florida Statutes115 and federal and state 
constitutional due process?116 While the method of service on mobile homes is not 
specifically provided by statute, it appears that federal and state constitutional law 
may require hand delivery, mailing, posting, and/or publication.117 If that is the case, 
then the legislature needs to amend the existing statute so there is no question about 
 ________________________  
 107. FLA. STAT. § 166.056 (1980); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla., No. 81-62 (1981), 
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/5BDF3D7B5932364D8525658700551D4A. 
 108. FLA. STAT. § 166.062 (1980). 
 109. Id. 
 110. FLA. STAT. § 162.12(1)(a) (2016). 
 111. See id. § 162.12(1)(2). This section sets forth with specificity how notice may be provided to the owner 
that may include notice to an additional address at the option of the local government. Id. However, without 
legislative direction the question is, does this apply to mobile home owners? And if so, how? 
 112. Id. § 162.12(1)(a). 
 113. Id. § 723.024, see discussion supra Part II. 
 114. FLA. STAT. § 320.015 (2016); see Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Gerald Sohn, 566 So. 2d 841, 842 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1990).  
 115. FLA. STAT. § 162.12 (2016). 
 116. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 801 (1983); see Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 566 So. 2d 
at 843. 
 117. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 793, 799–801. 
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what constitutes valid notice and service in accordance with federal and state 
constitutional due process requirements.118 
C. Reporting Code Violations: Is It Mandatory or Discretionary for the 
Mobile Home Park Owner in Light of Section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes? 
Is there a legal duty by mobile home park owners to report code violations? 
While there should be no reluctance by a mobile home park owner to report a mobile 
home owner’s code violations to the local government, according to a literal reading 
of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, this form of reporting (whether it is called 
self-reporting, third-party reporting, or simply reporting) by a non-offending party is 
supposedly designed to control and correct code violations by the use of policing 
partnerships between a local government and a mobile home park owner.119 
However, theory and practice are qualitatively different, and they both need to be 
reconciled so that the purpose of legislation and governance converge.120 If reporting 
by a non-offending party is a goal of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, 
reporting may not have been in the best interest of a mobile home park owner in its 
routine activities before enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, thereby 
suggesting a disconnect between a mobile home park owners’ goal of showing a 
profit and local governments’ goal of obtaining compliance with code violations on 
account of the strict liability resulting from section 162.09(3) of the Florida 
Statutes.121 The reason is that reporting of a code violation by a mobile home park 
owner would subject itself to potential fines and liens that could be assessed against 
the mobile home park owner, regardless of fault, if the local government learned of 
the code violations.122   
 ________________________  
 118. See generally id. (describing different means of providing notice). Until the legislature clarifies the 
situation, local governments should consider posting the code violation at the mobile home and citing the record 
title owner of the mobile home after obtaining the vehicle identification number (VIN) and license tag number of 
the mobile home for service. The mobile home park owner should have information about the mobile home, 
including title certificate, VIN, and license tag number, and that information should be shared with local government 
code enforcement officers. If the mobile home park owner fails to have this information, it might be obtained by 
looking outside on the frame of the mobile home and/or inside the mobile home, which would require the occupant’s 
consent to gain entry. The VIN may be called a manufacturer’s serial number on the data plate depending on the age 
of the mobile home, and the VIN may be found inside and on the wall of the master bedroom closet, near the back 
door, under the kitchen sink, on the inside of a cabinet door, in the furnace compartment, on the utility room wall, 
on cabinet doors, near electric panel, or elsewhere inside. See OLD REPUBLIC TITLE INSURANCE GROUP, TRAILERS, 
MOBILE HOMES, AND MANUFACTURED HOUSING UNITS 6.70 (Nov. 2007),  
http://www.oldrepublictitle.com/ganational/Guides/Mobile%20Homes%20Revised%2011-07.pdf. It is also 
incumbent on the local government to make certain that the final order imposed by the special magistrate comply 
with sections 162.09(3), 55.081, 55.10, 55.202–55.205 of the Florida Statutes, subject to corrections at a later date, 
so that the final order subjects the personal property to a fine and lien. 
 119. See Malik, supra note 47. 
 120. See Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal “Technicalities” as Resources for Theory, 18 SOC. 
& LEGAL STUD. 139, 140 (2009); Darren Sinclair, Self-Regulation Versus Command and Control? Beyond False 
Dichotomies, 19 L. & POL’Y 529, 532 (1997). 
 121. See FLA. STAT. §162.09(3) (2016). Disclosure of violations by a violator has been the subject of many 
research studies due to the fear of lives and penalties. Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting 
in Optimal Law Enforcement, J. OF L., ECON., AND ORG. 239–256 (2001). 
 122. See FLA. STAT. §162.09(3) (2016).  
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D. By Failing to Report a Code Violation, Does a Mobile Home Park 
Owner Place Itself into a Foreseeable Zone of Risk? 
In light of the enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, what if a 
mobile home park owner ignores code violations resulting from a mobile home 
owner’s action or inaction over a period of time? Are there any legal ramifications 
if there is silence and a failure to report code violations by a mobile home park 
owner? A Florida appellate court has specifically stated that if a mobile home park 
owner “created a foreseeable zone of risk” then there could be liability in a personal 
injury action.123 In Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC,124 a mobile home park 
owner/landlord was sued by a mobile home owner/tenant on account of fire ants that 
bit the tenant on the face and the neck as he walked his dog after he inadvertently 
brushed up against community bushes that were to be cared for by the mobile home 
park owner/landlord.125 The mobile home park owner did not have specific 
knowledge of the hazard presented by the fire ants to the premises where the tenants 
resided, although the landlord’s duty included spraying insecticide alternative 
months in order to kill ants, in addition to treatment of any visible ant mounds with 
granules.126 The appellate court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the mobile 
home park owner, and ruled that there was no duty owed to the tenant to guard 
against the red ants under these circumstances as the red ants were wild animals 
pursuant to the doctrine of ferae naturae.127 However, the appellate court indicated 
that the proper inquiry was whether the landlord’s conduct “created a foreseeable 
zone of risk,”128 rather than whether the landlord could foresee the specific injury 
that actually occurred.129 Thus, if a mobile home park owner knew or should have 
known about a mobile home owner’s code violations, the mobile home park owner 
might be held responsible for not correcting code violations as a participant.130 By 
failing to report code violations to the local government, this could worsen existing 
code violations making the mobile home park owner part and parcel to the mobile 
homeowner’s misconduct, resulting in a foreseeable zone of risk on account of 
known circumstances that worsened over a period of time,131 thereby exposing 
 ________________________  
 123. Hanrahan v. Hometown Am. LLC, 90 So. 3d 915, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
 124. See generally id. 
 125. Id. at 916–17. 
 126. “Pinelake maintenance and office staff testified that in addition to the exterminator’s insecticide 
treatments, the maintenance staff would treat any visible mounds with granules.” Id. at 917. 
 127. Id. at 916. 
 128. Id. at 917. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 34–35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
This case is a demonstration of the power and the patience of one local government involving the character of a 
campground that had changed for residents who built permanent structures and what became mobile homes, which 
did not comply with the local government’s zoning restrictions making code enforcement proceedings a viable 
alternative. The real property was originally zoned as a Recreational Vehicle District where permanent structures 
were not allowed. Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. was litigated before enactment of section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes, but sets forth an example how mobile home owners and a mobile home park had to have been 
responsible for the change in use resulting in code violations that were at odds with the existing zoning regulations.    
 131. Kolosky v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 472 So. 2d 891, 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining a 
foreseeable risk of harm); see generally Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 248–49 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1984) (addressing foreseeable zone of risk liability that could fall partly on the mobile home park owners). 
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mobile home park owners to potential responsibility.132 While there does not appear 
to be any state statute requiring the public to report code violations,133 there is an 
implicit obligation on the public to do so by acts of public service so that serious 
violations that may endanger the public safety are reported and investigated.134    
Whether section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes creates a legal duty on a mobile 
home park owner to report code violations to its local government is an issue that 
may need to be resolved by the judiciary.135 Although section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes does not specifically say that a mobile home park owner is under a legal 
duty to report code violations resulting from the acts of a mobile home owner/tenant, 
a goal of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may have been to encourage mobile 
home park owners to report code violations to local governments without necessarily 
 ________________________  
 132. See Hanrahan v. Hometown Am. LLC, 90 So. 3d 915, 917 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (relying upon 
McCain v. Florida Power Corp, 593 So. 2d 500, 504 (Fla. 1992), which explained that: “[t]he duty element of 
negligence focuses on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses a 
general threat of harm to others.”). While section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the decisions in Hanrahan may 
have different purposes, there should be no question that if a mobile home park owner sees a mobile home owner 
violating a local building code with an attachment built onto their unit among any other code violations, it should 
not just sit back, but rather it should report the code violation with due diligence and promptly report the violations 
caused by the mobile home owner to the local government, or else it is entirely possible that by sitting back the 
mobile home park owner could be part of a larger scheme involving the creation of a zone of risk and foreseeability 
in a spider web of conduct that created a broader “zone of risk” that poses a threat of harm to others. Accordingly, 
in addition to notifying the local government, the mobile home park owner ought to work with the local government 
and provide notice to the mobile home owner of the code violation in a civil action involving a breach of lease 
agreement by claiming that there is a failure to comply with local government code provisions, requiring a removal 
of tenant/eviction action against the mobile home owner should he or she fail or refuse to comply with the local 
government code provision. See FLA. STAT § 723.062 (2016).   
 133. See FLA. STAT § 162.06 (2016). As to reporting of code violations, the only mention in Chapter 162 
states: “(1) It shall be the duty of the code inspector to initiate enforcement proceedings of the various codes; 
however, no member of a board shall have the power to initiate such enforcement proceedings.” Id. A board member 
should be free to report code violations as a member of the general public. Further, there is nothing specifically 
stated in subsections 723.022–723.024 about any requirement to report code violations, yet it would almost seem 
implausible if a code violation is not reported by neighbors in such close knit premises where a code violation could 
impact nearby neighbors. See Zuccarelli v. Barfield, 199 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).  
 134. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Econ. Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 
38 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 45, 66 (2000) (discussing the importance of self-reporting); see Donald J. Black, The 
Mobilization of Law, 2 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 125, 129–35 (1973). There is no question that failure to report and 
investigate code violations can lead to tragic circumstances. See Kristin J. Bender & Brian Melley, Death Toll Grows 
to 36 at Oakland Warehouse Fire, OBSERVER REP. (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.observerreporter.com/20161205/deathtollgrowsto36atoaklandwarehousefire; Katrina Lamansky, 
Deadly Warehouse Fire in Oakland, CA Prompts Criminal Investigation, WQAD NEWS 8 (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://wqad.com/2016/12/06/deadly-warehouse-fire-in-oakland-ca-prompts-criminal-investigation/. At least one 
large city posted information so that its residents may report code violations after the Oakland, California fire 
tragedy. See Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Philadelphia, Joint Statement on Deadly Oakland Warehouse 
Fire (Dec. 7, 2016). Even if code violations are reported, complaints are only the first step in obtaining compliance 
as code officers may need to gain entrance into the property to determine if violations exist for citation purposes. 
The Oakland, California warehouse fire involved structures that had been built inside the warehouse without permits 
where the property was being used as a residence. See Phil Willon & Matt Hamilton, Building Inspectors Had Not 
Been Inside Oakland Warehouse in 30 years, Officials Say, LA TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-ln-oakland-fire-inspections-20161207-story.html. An inspector who 
visited the warehouse fifteen days before the fire to investigate a possible illegal interior building structure was 
unable to get inside, even after complaints were made. Id. 
 135. Further, local governments have limited financial resources and personnel to enforce code violations. 
Without the public’s help, code compliance departments would be seriously deterred in finding code violations. See 
Bennett v. Walton Cty., 174 So. 3d 386, 392–93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); City of Delray Beach v. St. Juste, 989 
So. 2d 655, 656–57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
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making mobile home park owners responsible. The rationale for this view is that 
there are unique factors in the relationship between mobile home owners and mobile 
home park owners.136 However, it should be noted that if a mobile home park owner 
knowingly ignores violations on its real property resulting from acts of a mobile 
home owner as described in Sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes, there could still be responsibility implicated onto a mobile home park owner 
by a local government.137  
E. To Report or Not to Report, That Is the Question: Risk and Reward of 
Reporting Violations 
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes can be seen as a vehicle that promotes a 
number of different grounds of responsibility between a mobile home park owner 
and mobile home owner. While the statute may exempt mobile home park owners 
from being strictly responsible for code violations resulting from the acts of mobile 
home owners, does the statute suggest that if there is an exemption from 
responsibility, there is an obligation to report code violations? Section 723.024 of 
the Florida Statutes does not direct a mobile home park owner to report code 
violations, but if a mobile home park owner will not be responsible for code 
violations resulting from mobile home owners acts if they are reported, then a mobile 
home park owner needs to take responsibility and report code violations as part of 
its new agency relationship with local governments.138 If a mobile home park owner 
fails to report code violations resulting from mobile home owners conduct, then that 
could place the mobile home park owner a step closer to being named a responsible 
party if it sits back and remains silent. While the zone of risk case law cited earlier 
in this article139 should apply regardless of the possible exemption contained in 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, if the mobile home park owner could be seen 
as having foreseen a zone of risk, especially in light of the encouragement this statute 
appears to provide to a mobile home park owner to report code violations, then by 
sitting back the mobile home park owner could be considered as an active member 
in a scheme or design that both the mobile home park owner and the mobile home 
owner have developed.140 Besides potential civil liability that might be imposed, if 
the mobile home park owner ignores code violations, there could be a breach of a 
legal duty by ignoring code violations; as the time horizon grows from the date of 
 ________________________  
 136. See Munao, Munao, Munao & Munao v. Homeowners Ass’n of La Buona Vita Mobile Home Park, Inc., 
740 So. 2d 73, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).  
 137. See discussions supra Part VI and infra Part IX. 
 138. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). All local governments welcome neighborhoods and residents to report 
code violations as part of their duty to maintain the health, safety and welfare of the community and maintain high 
property values. See, e.g., Code Enforcement, CITY OF ORLANDO, (last visited Apr. 21, 2017) 
http://www.cityoforlando.net/code-enforcement/.  
 139. See discussion supra Part VI.D. 
 140. See discussion supra Part VI. D and infra Part IX. 
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any code violations attributable to acts of a mobile home owner, the risk of liability 
grows as well.141   
While there is a risk in failing to report existing code violations caused by a 
mobile home owner, there is also a return risk to a mobile home park owner due to 
what might be a statutory exemption from responsibility.142 By reporting code 
violations, local government code enforcement should be able to conduct its due 
diligence and move toward obtaining compliance in a partnership and agency 
relationship between the local government and the mobile home park owner sooner 
rather than later.143 By ignoring code violations, the mobile home park owner may 
be subjecting itself not only to potential liability in creation of a foreseeable zone of 
risk,144 but this inaction may influence a decision by the local government to join the 
mobile home park owner as a joint participant in a code enforcement proceeding 
against the mobile home owner and the mobile home park owner.145  
It makes sense for a mobile home park owner to report code violations resulting 
from action or inaction of a mobile home owner on account of the statutory language 
contained in section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the foreseeable zone of risk 
that could be applied to a mobile home park owner if it sits back and ignores code 
violations. Under the ambit of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, the mobile 
home park owner is encouraged to report a code violation resulting from a mobile 
home owner.146 The quid pro quo between a local government and a mobile home 
park owner is that by reporting code violations, the mobile home park owner may be 
exempt from being held responsible for code violations of a mobile home owner 
when there is a police partnership and agency relationship between a local 
government and a mobile home park owner.147 In essence, agency theory is applied 
differently after enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, because the 
mobile home park owner has become an agent of the local government.148 In 
reporting mobile home owners’ code violations, the mobile home park owner helps 
the local government maintain the health, safety, and welfare of the community; 
through this form of an agency, it is hoped that there will be a better quality of life 
for its residents, and the valuation of the mobile home park and local governments’ 
 ________________________  
 141. See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992); Key Largo Ocean Resort Co-Op, Inc. 
v. Monroe Cty., 5 So. 3d 31, 32–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Rest., Inc., 
834 So. 2d 861 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).  
 142. See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see Malik, supra note 47, at 251 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 582, 601 (1994). 
 143. See Zuccarelli v. Barfield, 199 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016). 
 144. See McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503; Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1989) (“Where a defendant’s 
conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize a duty placed upon defendant either to 
lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions are taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.”); 
Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 925 (Fla. 1985) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting); FLA. STAT. 
§ 162.09(2)(b) (2016) (providing that the gravity of the violation, any actions taken by the violator to correct, and 
prior violations may be considered when imposing a fine). 
 145. See discussion infra Part X. 
 146. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see also Bennett v. Walton Cty., 174 So. 3d 386, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2015) (Makar, J., dissenting) (discussing a property rented for weddings and other festivities which were the subject 
of a code violation that the owners of the property were ultimately held responsible). 
 147. See Malik, supra note 47, at 255–56. 
 148. See id.  
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tax base will be enhanced over the long term.149 The fact that reporting by a mobile 
home park owner to a local government is self-serving should be considered 
immaterial.   
Whether the responsible party is the mobile home owner or the mobile home 
park owner, or both, it is a quasi-judicial code compliance proceeding brought by the 
local government that will ultimately decide who is responsible after considering the 
facts and circumstances of the case.150 However, there is a caveat to these provisions 
on responsibility as provided in section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes. There will 
be ongoing disputes about which party is ultimately the responsible party for code 
violations depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, whether the local 
government charges and prosecutes a code enforcement violation against the mobile 
home owner, mobile home park owner, or both.151 Depending on the time and costs 
associated with any prosecution or defense, it will not be surprising if one party 
attempts to blame-shift and argue that the other party is responsible.152        
VII. DO SECTIONS 723.022, 723.023, AND 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES 
INFRINGE UPON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE OF ARTICLE II, 
SECTION 3 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION? 
The separation of powers doctrine at article II, section 3 of the Florida 
Constitution provides as follows: “The powers of the state government shall be 
divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one 
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless 
expressly provided herein.”153 These three sovereign powers divide into three 
coordinate branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—that strictly prohibit a 
person belonging to one branch from exercising any power relating to either of the 
other branches unless expressly provided.154   
While sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes155 attempt 
to bifurcate responsibility between a mobile home owner and mobile home park 
owner, does section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes156 remove discretion from a 
local government code enforcement officer’s decision to file a quasi-judicial action 
against a responsible party? Decisions whether to prosecute a violator who is a real 
property owner or non-real property owner administratively or civilly rests within 
the control of the executive, whether it be the state attorney, who has the authority 
 ________________________  
 149. See Schilling, supra note 84, at 149–51; Hipler, supra note 84, at 682–83; Raymond J. Burby, Peter J. 
May, Emil E. Malizia & Joyce Levine, Building Code Enforcement Burdens and Central City Decline, 66 J. OF THE 
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 143, 144, 147 (2000); Rosser, supra note 46, at 35–36.  
 150. See FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06(2), 723.022–723.024 (2016). 
 151. See FLA. STAT. § 27.02(1) (2016); Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 152. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982); Chamberlain v. Eisinger, 159 So. 3d 185, 188 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Matthews v. St. Petersburg Auto Auction, Inc., 190 So. 2d 215, 215–16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1966). 
 153. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 154. Id.; see State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345, 353–54 (Fla. 2000); Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla. 
1953); Walker v. Bentley, 660 So. 2d 313, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).  
 155. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.024 (2016). 
 156. Id. § 723.024(1). 
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to prosecute or refuse to prosecute a criminal charge,157 or a local government 
attorney, who has the authority to prosecute code enforcement violations 
administratively or by civil complaint.158 It is fundamental that a local government 
attorney has the authority to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or voluntarily dismiss a 
building and zoning enforcement action in order to obtain compliance with code 
violations.159 The State Attorney has the authority to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or 
dismiss criminal cases.160 In all instances, the decision on who to charge and what 
charges to bring resides exclusively with the executive branch, not the judicial or 
legislative branches.161 The authority to file, prosecute, abate, settle, or voluntarily 
dismiss claims are exclusively executive functions and cannot be supervised or 
controlled by the judiciary, which has no role in advising, directing, or supervising 
a local government on whether to file and prosecute a civil, administrative, or 
criminal action.162 Instead, the role of the judiciary is limited to adjudicating any 
disputes in an action when it is properly at issue.163 Similarly, the legislature does 
not have the right to direct or supervise executive functions of a local government 
attorney on whether to file and prosecute a civil, administrative, or criminal action 
and against whom charges can be filed.164 The legislature also does not have the right 
to hinder or remove the executive branch’s discretion on who to charge and what 
charges should be brought.165 The legislature does have the power to enact laws and 
declare what the law is, and accordingly after doing so, it rests with the executive 
and judicial branch to follow the law, subject to each branch’s exclusive role and 
function.166   
 ________________________  
 157. See Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see Freeman v. State, 969 So. 
2d 473, 479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 158. See Rudge v. City of Stuart, 65 So. 3d 645, 646–47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); City of Jacksonville v. 
Blue Stone Constr., Inc., 48 So. 3d 941, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 159. See Rudge, 65 So. 3d at 646–47; City of Jacksonville, 48 So. 3d at 942; Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 468 So. 2d 912, 922 (Fla. 1985); Detournay v. City of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869, 870 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2013); City of Freeport v. Beach Cmty. Bank, 108 So. 3d 684, 689, 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  
 160. See, e.g., Young v. State, 699 So. 2d 624, 626–27 (Fla. 1997); State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986). 
 161. See Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3; Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982). 
 162. See Valdes v. State, 728 So. 2d 736, 738–39 (Fla. 1999) (The prosecuting officer, the state attorney, has 
complete discretion in deciding whether to charge and prosecute a defendant, and the judiciary cannot interfere with 
this discretionary executive function); Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3 (“Under Florida’s [C]onstitution, the decision to 
charge and prosecute is an executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in deciding 
whether and how to prosecute.”); Johnson v. State, 314 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1975) (“[T]he discretion of the Attorney 
General in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute, or to abandon a prosecution already started, is 
absolute.”); Bess v. Reno, 563 So. 2d 95, 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the trial court did not err in 
refusing, in effect, to mandamus the state attorney to institute extradition proceedings); Thompson v. Reno, 546 So. 
2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the state attorney’s discretion extends to civil actions as well as 
criminal actions); State v. Jogan, 388 So. 2d 322, 323 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the decision to nolle 
prosequi is vested solely with the state attorney’s discretion and cannot be made or supervised by the courts); State 
v. C.C.B., 465 So. 2d 1379, 1381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“In the criminal justice system the discretion to 
prosecute or not is a pre-trial posture vested solely in the state attorney’s discretion.”). 
 163. FLA. CONST. art. V, §1; but see Trianon Park Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 468 So. 2d at 922; Detournay, 127 So. 
3d at 873.  
 164. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 
1991); Cleveland, 417 So. 2d at 654. 
 165. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 263–64; Walker, 660 So. 2d at 320; Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 
3; Cleveland, 417 So. 2d at 654. 
 166. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–08; Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264; Bloom, 497 So. 2d at 3; Cleveland, 417 So. 2d at 
654. 
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Whether any statutory prohibition on who may be charged for specially 
designated code violations as provided in section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes 
constitutes a violation of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution and the 
principle that “no branch may encroach upon the powers of another”167 will have to 
await judicial determination. Neither the judiciary nor the legislature have the right 
to direct or supervise executive functions of a local government attorney or the State 
Attorney on whether to file and prosecute a civil, administrative, or criminal action 
and against whom charges may be filed.168 Thus, an argument can be made that if 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes says that a local government code 
enforcement prosecutor can only cite a mobile home park owner or mobile home 
owner in specially set circumstances, such enactment might run afoul of the 
separation of powers doctrine of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution.169 
Although there is an inherent distinction between judicial power and quasi-judicial 
power according to their respective proceedings,170 the authority to file, prosecute, 
abate, settle, or dismiss actions in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings falls 
exclusively within the province of the prosecuting authority, not the legislature or 
the judiciary.171   
VIII. WHAT EFFECT DOES THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE IN ARTICLE VIII, 
SECTION 2(B) OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION HAVE ON SECTION 723.024 OF 
THE FLORIDA STATUTES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ CODE PROVISIONS? 
Section 723.024(1) of the Florida Statutes says that a local government shall only 
cite and sanction the responsible party, whereas section 723.024(2) says that a local 
government may not obtain a lien or fine for any breach of duty other than what is 
declared in sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes.172 There is a risk if 
a local government charges a mobile home park owner with a code violation if there 
is evidence that a mobile home owner’s acts are the cause of the code violation.173 
The preemption doctrine, which is found in article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida 
Constitution,174 provides that local governments lack authority to craft their own 
exceptions to general state laws, ”except as otherwise provided by law,”175 and it 
establishes the constitutional superiority of the legislature’s power over the power of 
local governments.176 Although local governments generally have “the power to 
enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state Legislature may 
 ________________________  
 167. See Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264; Walker, 660 So. 2d at 320. 
 168. See supra notes 154, 157, 159–64 and accompanying text. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See Laborers’ Int’l Union, Local 478 v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160, 1161–62 (Fla. 1989). 
 171. See supra notes 154, 157, 159–64 and accompanying text. 
 172. FLA. STAT. §§ 723.024(1)–(2) (2016). 
 173. Id.  
 174. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2(b). 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id.  
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act,”177 local governments are precluded from taking any action that conflicts with a 
state statute in exercising their power.178  
In considering the impact of article VIII, section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution 
and section 723.004(3) of the Florida Statutes179 to Mobile Home Park Lot 
Tenancies, the $64,000 question180 is what may happen if a local government charges 
a mobile home park owner and/or a mobile home owner in a code enforcement 
proceeding that runs afoul to the literal wording of section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes? Assuming for the sake of argument that a mobile home park owner fails to 
report code violations caused by a mobile home owner where a mobile home park 
owner knew or should have known about the violations of local government code 
provisions, what impact could this have on a non-compliant mobile home park 
owner? If a mobile home park owner knew or should have known about the mobile 
home owners code violations and did nothing, the mobile home park owner could be 
responsible for taking no measures to correct the code violations as a participant or 
accomplice.181 A state preemption argument can be made against joining a mobile 
home park owner as a co-respondent in a code enforcement proceeding on account 
of sections 723.004(3)182 and 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes.183 For one, if a local 
government ordinance is enacted that allows joinder of a mobile home park owner 
in a code enforcement proceeding that is the fault of a mobile home owner according 
to the applicable provisions of sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes, 
then that ordinance would be a violation of sections 723.004(3) and 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes.184 Similarly, if a local government ordinance is enacted that allows 
joinder of a mobile home owner in a code enforcement proceeding that is the 
responsibility of a mobile home park owner according to the applicable provisions 
of Sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes, then that ordinance would 
be a violation of Sections 723.004(3) and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.185 Chapter 
723 takes priority over any local government ordinance relating to Mobile Home 
Park Lot Tenancies, in the absence of legislative authority permitting deference to a 
local government or joint and dual authority over a subject matter that does not 
specifically exist at this time.186 Therefore, the preemption doctrine of the article 
 ________________________  
 177. FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (2016). 
 178. City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2013). 
 179. FLA. STAT. § 723.004(3) (2016) (“It is expressly declared by the Legislature that the relationship between 
landlord and tenant as treated by or falling within the purview of this chapter is a matter reserved to the state and 
that units of local government are lacking in jurisdiction and authority in regard thereto. All local statutes and 
ordinances in conflict herewith are expressly repealed.”). 
 180. The $64,000 Question, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/quizshow/peopleevents/pande06.html (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2016) (“The $64,000 Question” was an American game show broadcast from 1955 to 1958, which 
became embroiled in the 1950s quiz show scandals.). 
 181. See discussion infra Part X; supra Part VI.C–E. 
 182. FLA. STAT. § 723.004(3) (2016) (“It is expressly declared by the Legislature that the relationship between 
landlord and tenant as treated by or falling within the purview of this chapter is a matter reserved to the state and 
that units of local government are lacking in jurisdiction and authority in regard thereto. All local statutes and 
ordinances in conflict herewith are expressly repealed.”). 
 183. See id. § 723.024. 
 184. See id. §§ 723.004(3), 723.022–723.024. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See City of Palm Bay v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 114 So. 3d 924, 928–29 (Fla. 2013); 
City of Aventura v. Masone, 89 So. 3d 233, 235–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011), rev’d sub nom. 147 So. 3d 492, 494–
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VIII, section 2(b) Florida Constitution should prohibit any duly enacted ordinance 
that conflicts with Chapter 723, and more particularly section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes.187   
Article VIII, section 2(b) Florida Constitution needs to be considered before a 
local government charges a mobile home owner and mobile home park owner with 
a code violation.  The only way a local government can act concurrently and jointly 
file charges against a mobile home owner and a mobile home park owner is if an 
ordinance is permitted to co-exist under state law.188 But that may not be likely on 
account of section 723.004 (3) of the Florida Statutes.189  However, if there was a 
bona fide dispute as to who is responsible for certain code violations listed in sections 
723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, common sense should prevail 
and allow a local government to join a mobile home owner and the mobile home 
park owner in the same or separate administrative proceedings for a determination 
of who is the responsible party. If both are joined in the same proceeding, the special 
magistrate should be able to air out which of the parties is responsible after 
considering the circumstances of the case, depending on whether there is substantial, 
competent evidence to support a conviction against one or both parties.190 If only one 
party is charged independently of the other in a code enforcement proceeding and 
cleared, then the other party could be charged in a successive proceeding in 
determining whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support a 
conviction, as long as he or she was not charged and adjudicated in an initial 
proceeding.191  There is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against separate 
administrative proceedings against different parties, as long as there is substantial, 
competent evidence to support which party is responsible for a code violation in an 
initial or successive administrative hearing.192 However, the doctrine of res judicata 
is applicable to rulings and decisions of administrative bodies, thus barring a 
successive prosecution against the same party under identical facts and 
circumstances.193    
 ________________________  
96 (Fla. 2014); see also City of Orlando v. Udowychenko, 98 So. 3d 589, 595–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 
147 So. 3d 492 (Fla. 2014).  
 187. See City of Palm Bay, 114 So. 3d at 928–29; Masone, 89 So. 3d at 235–36, rev’d sub nom. 147 So. 3d at 
494–96; see also Udowychenko, 98 So. 3d at 595–96.    
 188. See Masone, 147 So. 3d at 501 (Pariente, J., dissenting). 
 189. See id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 723.004(3), 723.022–723.024 (2016). 
 190. See Bd. of Cty. Com’rs. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474–75 (Fla. 1993); De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 
912, 916 (Fla. 1957); Town of Mangonia Park v. Palm Beach Oil, Inc., 436 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983). 
 191. See White v. School Bd., 466 So. 2d 1141, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Rubin v. Sanford, 168 So. 
2d 774, 774–75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied 180 So. 2d 331, 331 (Fla. 1965). 
 192. See Rubin, 168 So. 2d at 774–75; Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474–75; De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916. 
 193. Hollingsworth v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Regulation, 466 So. 2d 383, 384, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); 
Doheny v. Grove Isle, Ltd., 442 So. 2d 966, 970 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Metro. Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 
v. Rockmatt Corp., 231 So. 2d 41, 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970). As mentioned, res judicata would apply between 
the local government and the party involved in the proceeding if either tried to re-litigate the case with the same 
facts and circumstances thereby precluding a second bite of the apple in the absence of a different set of facts and 
circumstances. If a code enforcement order was entered by a special magistrate, and no appeal or a late appeal was 
taken by the losing party, under such circumstances there would be no jurisdiction by a circuit court to consider an 
appeal. See Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. 
Bamman, 519 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).  
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By deciding to join a mobile home park owner and a mobile home owner in a 
code violation proceeding, sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes need to be considered, but until there is a definitive ruling about the statutes’ 
impact, a local government should be able to proceed with charging one or both 
parties if the evidence warrants.194 If there is evidence showing that a mobile home 
park owner or a mobile home owner, or both, caused the code violations, the sole 
issue is whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support a conviction.195 
If that is shown, then as long as fundamental due process is provided to the parties, 
such a procedure should allow a special magistrate to decide which of the parties is 
responsible so that a fine and lien can be imposed against one or both of the violating 
parties.196 It is also important to keep in mind that section 723.024(1) of the Florida 
Statutes emphasizes that only the responsible party shall be charged, and as always, 
as long as the local government does its due diligence in making that determination, 
even in considering section 723.024(2) of the Florida Statutes, it should be the quasi-
judicial proceeding that ought to decide responsibility.197   
IX. DOES SECTION 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES VIOLATE THE ACCESS 
TO COURTS PROVISION LOCATED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 21 OF THE FLORIDA 
CONSTITUTION? 
A. Does Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes Provide Procedural Pitfalls 
and Barriers that Result in a Violation of Article I, Section 21 of the 
Florida Constitution? 
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes bifurcates responsibility between mobile 
home owners and mobile home park owners.198 Is the legislature’s attempt to 
negotiate distinctions in responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile 
home park owners workable? Is there too much emphasis by local governments in 
providing an “an expeditious, effective, and inexpensive method”199 to enforce code 
violations of a local government without regard to the entirety of the evidence? In 
light of the statute’s attempt to define which party is responsible for a code violation, 
does this statute violate the access to courts provision that is found in article I, section 
21 of the Florida Constitution?200 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes places 
 ________________________  
 194. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475; De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916; Town of Mangonia Park, 436 So. 2d at 1139.  
 195. See Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 475; De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916; Town of Mangonia Park, 436 So. 2d at 1139.  
 196. FLA. STAT. §§ 162.07(1), (4); 162.09(1)–(3) (2016). 
 197. See discussion supra Part VI; infra Part XII. 
 198. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). 
 199. Id. § 162.02. 
 200. See Maronda Homes v. Lakeview Res. Home Ass’n, 127 So. 3d 1258, 1272-73 (Fla. 2013). Section 
723.004(5) may preserve the right to sue in a civil action by providing an aggrieved party with the right to enforce 
a duty in a civil action after a party exhausts its administrative remedies. Section 723.0381(1) may also appear to 
preserve the right to sue in a civil action by providing an aggrieved party with the right to enforce a duty; however, 
if a local government prosecutes a code enforcement violation against either the mobile home park owner or the 
mobile home owner, a decision by the special magistrate could be res judicata against the losing party and preclude 
an aggrieved party from filing a civil action in circuit court. Florida district courts have ruled that failure to appeal 
a special magistrate’s order within thirty days bars an aggrieved party from later contesting identical code violations 
that were raised or that could have been raised before the special magistrate on the grounds of res judicata. See FLA. 
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responsibility on either the mobile home park owner or the mobile home owner on 
specifically described violations,201 and by doing so the statute may fail to provide a 
reasonable alternative for the aggrieved party to challenge a code charge in light of 
Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution.202 Section 723.038 of the Florida 
Statutes provides that a party may demand mediation to settle a dispute before an 
action is filed in circuit court,203 and if mediation is unsuccessful either party may 
file an action in circuit court pursuant to section 723.0381(1) of the Florida 
Statutes.204 While these two statutes appear to preserve the right to enforce a duty in 
circuit court for an aggrieved party,205 in light of section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes’s strict codification of what is and is not a violation by a mobile home owner 
and mobile home park owner before any evidence is presented, this statute may 
effectively eliminate access to the courts by limiting responsibility only to those 
identified in the statutes regardless of the evidence.206 
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution does not necessarily require a 
complete inability to gain access to the courts for there to be a violation of this 
constitutional provision.207 If a statute produces procedural pitfalls and difficulties 
so problematical and time-consuming that such procedures impede meaningful 
litigation of the merits of a cause, then such impediments to filing suit may make it 
improbable to proceed, which results in a violation of article I, section 21 of the 
 ________________________  
STAT. § 162.11 (2016) (governing appeals from final orders of code enforcement boards, which states: “An appeal 
shall be filed within 30 days of the execution of the order to be appealed”); Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 
1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (owner must appeal an adverse code enforcement ruling to the circuit court, 
not wait to challenge the facts after commencement of a foreclosure action on an adverse lien filed against the 
property owner); City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (circuit court was without 
jurisdiction on a certiorari review of a code enforcement board’s mitigation order that reduced an earlier imposed 
fine when the property owner had plead guilty to the code violation and failed to appeal the enforcement order); 
Verdi v. Metro. Dade Co., 684 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (when a special magistrate renders a ruling, 
the case is res judicata and cannot be retried later in a foreclosure action); Hardin v. Monroe Cty., 64 So. 3d 707, 
711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (while an earlier unappealed violation order is res judicata, an aggrieved party may 
timely appeal from a later entered enforcement order); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Bamman, 519 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (notice of appeal to the circuit court was timely filed as to a supplemental order of the board, 
but that failed to bring up for review the final order entered earlier, which had in all respects become final after thirty 
days of its entry).    
 201. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).  
 202. Id. § 723.024; see also N. Fla. Women’s Health Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003); Mitchell v. 
Moore, 786 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2001); Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). 
 203. FLA. STAT. § 723.038 (2016). 
 204. Id. § 723.0381(1). 
 205. Id. §§ 723.038, 723.0381(1). 
 206. Id. § 723.024; see also Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 524-28 (Fla. 2001) (copy requirement of the Prisoner 
Indigency statute is unconstitutional and violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution because it results 
in an insurmountable obstacle to a prisoner’s right to access the courts); Kluger, 281 So. 2d 1 (aggrieved party denied 
opportunity to litigate against defendant in tort for property damage arising from an automobile accident by 
abolishing tort claim against defendant and by making aggrieved party look to property damage with one’s own 
insurer violates article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution). Assuming arguendo that the statute is not 
unconstitutional on its face, one must question whether requiring an aggrieved party to comply with these conditions 
and barriers that have been mentioned might be unconstitutional as applied to an aggrieved mobile home owner who 
is effectively shut out of legitimately contesting code violations in civil court. See Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at 
Ormond Beach, 760 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 2000) (Volusia County’s public school impact fees were held to be 
unconstitutional as applied to mobile home park that provides housing for persons at least fifty-five years of age or 
older); Dep’t of Law Enf’t v. Real Prop., 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991) (forfeiture act was held not to be unconstitutional 
on its face, but was not constitutional as applied to property owner).   
 207. See supra note 206. 
27
: Do Code Violations and Liens Run with the Land?
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2017
184 Barry Law Review Vol. 22, No. 2 
Florida Constitution.208 A code enforcement proceeding brought pursuant to Chapter 
162 of the Florida Statutes begins and ends the dispute and results in res judicata 
barring a future civil action.209 Only fundamental due process applies in quasi-
judicial proceedings.210 Before a civil suit is filed, there is an available option for a 
mediation according to section 723.038 of the Florida Statutes if the parties believe 
that a resolution is possible, but that procedure may be nothing more than an attempt 
to extend the litigation by a party that is costly and time consuming.211 If pre-filing 
procedures do not work, after a civil suit is filed the assigned judge may order non-
binding arbitration according to section 723.0381(2) of the Florida Statutes with its 
attendant costs.212 Once a civil suit is filed, a judge could still order mediation before 
trial.213 By imposing such barriers before a civil court reaches the merits (if it ever 
does reach the merits), when these procedures are used separately or together they 
can result in insurmountable burdens and a chilling effect that are problematical to 
an aggrieved mobile home owner, who usually has less funds to spend on litigation 
than a mobile home park owner.214 Therefore, article I, section 21 of the Florida 
Constitution may come into play on account of the procedural and substantive 
pitfalls and difficulties that limits civil litigation of the merits by a mobile home 
owner in light of the specifically described violations that is provided in sections 
723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.215  
The attempt to determine responsibility by section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes is not black and white.216 There is no reason to believe that this statute should 
conclusively determine which party is or is not responsible for a violation making 
disputes about responsibility in mobile home parks likely to occur.217 Whether 
 ________________________  
 208. Id.  
 209. See Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); City of Miami v. Cortes, 
995 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Verdi v. Metro. Dade Co., 684 So. 2d 870, 871(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996); Hardin v. Monroe Cty., 64 So. 3d 707, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  
 210. See FLA. STAT. §162.07(3) (2016). 
 211. Id. § 723.038. While pre-filing mediation is discretionary with the parties, if used each party must pay a 
filing fee toward the ultimate fee to be charged by the appointed mediator.   
 212. See Fla. R. Civ. Pr. 1.820; FLA. STAT. § 723.0381(2) (2016) (granting the trial court the option to order 
non-binding arbitration). The purpose of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.820 motion for trial is to accelerate the 
litigation, make the parties evaluate the arbitration award, and either accept it or bring it to an end through trial. See 
Nicholson-Kenny Capital Mgmt. v. Steinberg, 932 So. 2d 321, 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Stowe v. Universal 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 937 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  
 213. See Fla. R. Civ. Pr. 1.700. 
 214. See Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d 61, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).  
 215. Aspen-Tarpon Springs, 635 So. 2d at 63; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022, 723.023, 723.024, 723.038, 
723.0381(2) (2016); City of Miami v. Cortes, 995 So. 2d 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Verdi v. Metro. Dade 
Co., 684 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Bamman, 519 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1987).  
 216. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984); Media Whiteco Outdoor v. Dep’t of Trans., 795 So. 2d 
991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);  
 217. See Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So.2d 1029, 1037-38 (Fla. 2001); Panama City Beach Cmty. 
Redevelopment Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665-69 (Fla. 2002); Las Olas Tower v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 742 
So. 2d 308, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982); Chamberlain v. 
Eisinger, 159 So. 3d 185, 188-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Matthews v. St. Petersburg Auto Auction, Inc., 190 So. 
2d 215, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). By analogy, rezoning matters can be considered quasi-judicial proceedings 
thereby granting local governments great deference when making a ruling. See Samara Dev’p Corp. v. Marlow, 556 
So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1990); Graham v. Estuary Props., Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981);  Public Employees Relations 
Comm’n v. Dade Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 467 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1985); Daniel v. Fla. State Turnpike Auth., 213 
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section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes violates the access to courts provision located 
in article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution has not been decided. However, 
nothing should be assumed because the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that placing 
undue burdens and barriers onto an aggrieved party as a condition precedent to filing 
and pursuing a civil suit may result in a constitutional challenge based on article I, 
section 21 of the Florida Constitution.218    
B. Are Consideration of Equitable Claims and Defenses by Special 
Magistrates Ample to Placate the Access to Courts Provision of Article I, 
Section 21 of the Florida Constitution? 
If a special magistrate may consider equitable claims in code enforcement 
proceedings, will that process alleviate concerns about an aggrieved party’s access 
to fairness and justice? While local governments have maintained that special 
magistrates do not have the authority to consider equitable defenses in code 
enforcement proceedings,219 there are a handful of legal decisions suggesting that 
special magistrates have authority to consider equitable defenses to code 
enforcement prosecutions upon proper proof.220 In Siegle v. Lee County,221 a Florida 
appellate court ruled that laches may be applied upon proper proof in a code 
enforcement proceeding to a long-standing code violation if a local government 
knew or should have known of the violations and did nothing for years.222 Equitable 
defenses such as estoppel, laches, and due process might bar enforcement, especially 
when a local government has taken some affirmative action to permit the code 
violation or to allow it to continue for years without objection.223 Thus, laches, 
estoppel, and due process are not inapplicable to code enforcement proceedings and 
may be raised subject to proper proof in accordance with the judicial doctrine of 
equity and fair play.224   
 ________________________  
So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty., Fla. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Sw. 
Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Broward Cty., 502 So.2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 218. See Mitchell, 786 So. 2d at 524-28; Kluger, 281 So.2d 1.  
 219. Florida case law has suggested that equitable defenses are only available in local government code 
enforcement proceedings under rare and exceptional circumstances because code enforcement is a governmental 
function for the benefit of the general public. See Siegle v. Lee Cty., 198 So. 3d 773, 774-75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2016); Castro v. Miami-Dade Cty. Code, 967 So. 2d 230, 233-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Nat’l City Bank of 
Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). While that doctrine remains alive today, there are more 
recent district court decisions suggesting that code enforcement proceedings that are quasi-judicial proceedings can 
consider issues concerning equity, fair play, and due process. See Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773; Monroe Cty. v. Carter, 41 
So. 3d 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; National City Bank of Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233. 
 220. See supra note 219. 
 221. Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773. 
 222. Id. at 778. 
 223. See Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773; Monroe Cty., 41 So. 3d 954; Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; Nat’l City Bank of 
Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233.  
 224. See supra note 223. The list may virtually be endless, and perhaps in future cases any other matter besides 
estoppel, laches, and due process might constitute an avoidance or defense. See Powell v. City of Sarasota, 953 So. 
2d 5, 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (city’s nuisance abatement efforts were aimed at African-American neighborhoods 
and amounted to selective enforcement); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cty., 14 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009) (city’s special exception code provision did not violate religious activities of church property that 
was used as a shelter for the homeless). 
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One must question whether the state legislature has ruled out the possibility that 
a local government may charge either a mobile home owner or mobile home park 
owner, or both, with code violations in light of the wording of section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes.225 In light of the statute’s use of “may” and “shall,” did the 
legislature intend to say that a violation of one provision of the statute was conclusive 
rather than prima facie evidence of a code violation that would effectively preclude 
local governments from retaining discretion to prosecute either a mobile home owner 
or mobile home park owner, or both, with code violations based upon whether there 
is substantial, competent evidence to support a code violation?226 It is more likely 
that the legislature left open for local governments a flexible framework to achieve 
an equitable result based upon proper proof,227 as distinguished from a literal and 
dead letter reading of the statute.228 However, even if the latter approach is applied, 
there are still a growing number of Florida appellate court decisions that permit 
special magistrates in code enforcement proceedings to consider equitable factors 
before deciding if there is a code violation.229 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes 
should be read in light of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution,230 case law 
permitting use of equitable defenses of property owners based on the evidence 
presented at special magistrates’ hearings that is now precedent in code enforcement 
proceedings,231 and existing precedent that grants deference to local governments in 
interpretation and enforcement of code provisions.232  
X. ARE CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION, AND AIDING AND ABETTING SUBJECT TO 
QUASI-JUDICIAL CODE ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS? 
Besides the statutory guidelines in sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of 
the Florida Statutes specifying which party is responsible, there may be other 
methods for local governments to show by substantial, competent evidence that a 
mobile home owner and mobile home park owner are jointly responsible for code 
violations.233 Florida jurisprudence allows conspiracy and collusion claims in a civil 
 ________________________  
 225. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016).     
 226. See DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973); Grand Union Co. v. Rocker, 454 
So. 2d 14, 16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kimmel, 465 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).  
 227. See Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194, 1202 (Fla. 2009); Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1287 (Fla. 2000); State v. DC, 114 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).  
 228. See David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, UNIV. OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, THE RECORD (ALUMNI 
MAGAZINE), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall10/strauss (last visited Mar. 8, 2017). 
 229. Siegle, 198 So. 3d 773; Monroe Cty., 41 So. 3d 954; Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; Nat’l City Bank of 
Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233. 
 230. See supra Part VII.   
 231. See Siegle, 198 So. 3d at 776-78; Monroe Cty., 41 So. 3d 954; Castro, 967 So. 2d 230; Nat’l City Bank 
of Cleveland, 902 So. 2d 233. 
 232. See Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jacobs, 810 So. 2d 906, 208 (Fla. 2002) (An “agency’s interpretation of the 
statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great deference.”); see also BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Johnson, 
708 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1998); PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1988); Orange Park Kennel 
Club, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 644 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“An agency’s 
construction of a statute which it administers is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned unless the agency’s 
interpretation is clearly erroneous; the agency’s interpretation need not be the sole possible interpretation or even 
the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations.”).  
 233. See discussion infra Part IX; supra Parts V.D–E.  
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action.234 In Town of Surfside v. Higgenbotham,235 an appellate court ruled that a 
victim could state a cause of action by adequately pleading and proving conspiracy 
to conceal the discharge of a firearm.236 In Southern Alliance Corporation v. City of 
Winter Haven,237 the court ruled that employees’ egregious actions in enforcing a 
city’s code by service of a cease and desist order emanating from the city’s Standard 
Fire Prevention Code and Life Safety Code could state a cause of action.238 There, a 
local law enforcement and fire department concluded that a business allowed 
“overcrowding” after an inspection of the business premises by the police and fire 
department and the execution of the order was handled egregiously according to the 
lounge’s second amended complaint.239 While Higgenbotham and Southern Alliance 
Corporation involved cases against a local government for civil liability, the courts 
stated that these sorts of claims against complicit and collusive parties could state a 
cause of action for civil conspiracy that would make the tenant and owner of the real 
property jointly responsible.240  
Besides conspiracy and collusion charges that could be filed against a mobile 
home park owner and mobile home owner in civil liability proceedings,241 there 
remains the possibility of aiding and abetting charges allowing a conviction of the 
principal and his or her accomplice. Under Florida law, those who actually commit 
the offense and those who aid, abet, or procure the commission of an offense are 
treated the same, regardless of their role in the commission of the offense or whether 
they are present during the final acts of the offense.242 While there are few, if any, 
civil conspiracy or aiding and abetting cases that have been prosecuted in code 
enforcement quasi-judicial proceedings, by knowingly remaining silent and failing 
to report a mobile home owner’s actions, such conduct could suggest a cover-up of 
code violations against the mobile home park owner’s accomplice, as well as the 
mobile home owner’s principal.243  Regardless of section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes, it is still possible for a local government to charge and argue that a mobile 
home park owner’s failure to report a code violation, attributable to the mobile home 
owner’s action, is tantamount to participation in civil collusion, conspiracy, and 
aiding and abetting, as long as it can be determined by direct evidence or inferred 
from circumstantial evidence that there was a definitive act in support of any code 
 ________________________  
 234. See Charles v. Fla. Foreclosure Placement Ctr., LLC, 998 So. 2d 1157, 1159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2008); Jacksonville Ferry Co. v. Stockton, 23 So. 557, 559 (Fla. 1898). 
 235. Town of Surfside v. Higgenbotham, 733 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 236. Id. at 1042–43. 
 237. S. All. Corp. v. Winter Haven, 505 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 238. Id. at 491–92, 494. 
 239. Id. at 492.  
 240. See Town of Surfside, 733 So. 2d at 1041–43; S. All. Corp., 505 So. 2d at 494, 496. 
 241. See supra note 240. 
 242. State v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265, 267 (Fla. 1988); Potts v. State, 430 So. 2d 900, 902 (Fla 1982); Connolly 
v. State, 172 So. 3d 893, 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).   
 243. Administrative agencies can construe a cover-up or aiding and abetting as a violation of an administrative 
rule.  See Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1039 (Fla. 2001); Mack v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., 914 So. 2d 986, 989 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Sch. Bd. v. Hargis, 400 So. 2d 103, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). While these decisions 
involve a number of different administrative agencies, they also suggest that these sorts of decisions could apply to 
code violations in a code enforcement action against a real property owner and tenant, as well as a mobile home 
park owner and mobile home owner.  
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violations.244 Whether or not there was a quid pro quo between a mobile home owner 
and mobile home park owner in a mobile home park owner’s failure to report code 
violations is immaterial as long as both parties agreed directly or indirectly not to 
correct code violations and they both sat back and ignored them; such action could 
be considered as a cover-up of what was unlawfully done and not corrected, making 
them both subject to prosecution in a quasi-judicial code enforcement proceeding.245 
XI. WHO IS THE RESPONSIBLE PARTY IN MOBILE HOME PARK LOT 
TENANCIES? 
A. Statutory Construction Doctrines: Can Sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 
of the Florida Statutes Be Construed Together?  
In considering the language in sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes, can these statutes be construed together? A fundamental rule of statutory 
construction is that statutes that relate to the same or a closely related subject are 
regarded as in pari materia and must be compared with each other and construed 
together.246 This legal doctrine requires courts to construe related statutes together 
so that they explain each other and are harmonized if possible.247 Section 162.09(3) 
of the Florida Statutes specifically provides: “A certified copy of an order imposing 
a fine, or a fine plus repair costs, may be recorded in the public records and thereafter 
shall constitute a lien against the land on which the violation exists and upon any 
other real or personal property owned by the violator.”248 On the other hand, section 
723.024(1) provides that “the unit of local government shall cite the responsible 
party for the violation . . . ,”249 and section 723.024(2) provides:  
A lien, penalty, fine, or other administrative or civil proceeding may 
not be brought against a mobile home owner or mobile home for any 
duty or responsibility of the mobile home park owner under 
s. 723.022 or against a mobile home park owner or mobile home 
park property for any duty or responsibility of the mobile home 
owner under s. 723.023.250 
 ________________________  
 244. Charles v. Fla. Foreclosure Placement Ctr., LLC, 988 So. 2d 1157, 1159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(explaining that civil conspiracy requires: (1) an arrangement between two or more parties; (2) for an unlawful act 
or to do a lawful act by an unlawful means; (3) performing of an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy; and (4) 
damage as result of the acts done under the conspiracy). 
 245. See discussion supra Parts VII.A, C–E.  
 246. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Contractpoint Fla, Parks, L.L.C., 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265–66 (Fla. 2008); 
Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 222 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (“The majority interpretation also violates the 
cardinal rules of statutory interpretation which say that statutes should be read in pari materia and all provisions 
should be given effect where possible.”); Ferguson v. State, 377 So. 2d 709, 710–11 (Fla. 1979); Alachua Cty. v. 
Powers, 351 So. 2d 32, 40 (Fla. 1977); Singleton v. Larson, 46 So. 2d 186, 190 (Fla. 1950).  
 247. See Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 986 So. 2d at 1265–66; Holly, 450 So. 2d at 222; Ferguson, 377 So. 2d at 
710–11; Powers, 351 So. 2d at 40; Singleton, 46 So. 2d at 190. 
 248. FLA. STAT. § 162.09(3) (2016). 
 249. Id. § 723.024(1). 
 250. Id. § 723.024(2).  
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In as much as sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes are 
interconnecting statutes, they should be read together before reaching a conclusion 
about the legislative intent of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.251 However, in 
light of their differences, a question remaining is: Can this be done? Section 
162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes and section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes seem to 
remain inconsistent and even incompatible, and if that is the case, then they may or 
may not be able to be read together.252    
Another principle of statutory construction is that a specific statute covering a 
particular subject area controls over a statute covering the same subjects in more 
general terms.253 The rationale of this tenet is that a more specific statute is 
considered to be an exception to the general terms of the more general statute.254 This 
tenet may or may not apply here because both sections 162.09(3) and 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes are specific, except that it can be argued that section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes may be more specific than section 162.09(3), as section 723.024 of 
the Florida Statutes applies only to mobile home park owners and mobile home 
owners, whereas section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes applies to all violators who 
own land and provide that a code violation and lien run with the land.255   
Within Chapter 162, the legislature created a comprehensive statutory scheme 
that sets forth the role of quasi-judicial proceedings in code enforcement actions.256 
Part and parcel to this chapter is the paradigm that code violations and liens run with 
the land in quasi-judicial and civil proceedings involving code enforcement 
violations.257 Upon enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, if the 
legislature attempted to carve out an exception that only applies to mobile home park 
tenancies, then the next step is to look at the literal interpretation of each statute and 
if it leads to an unreasonable result, a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that 
there must be a clear statement by the legislature to partially annul section 162.09(3) 
of the Florida Statutes, which does not exist.258 Section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes has a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies, and therefore if it is 
determined that an unreasonable result rule of statutory construction results in a 
 ________________________  
 251. Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 668 So. 2d 189, 198–99 (Fla. 2007), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. 
§ 63 (2016) as recognized in Children’s Home Soc’y of Fla. v. V.D., 188 So. 3d 920, 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); 
Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). 
 252. See Knowles v. Beverly Enter.-Fla, Inc., 898 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2004); Holly, 450 So. 2d at 222; Killearn 
Homes Ass’n v. Visconti Family, Ltd. P’ship, 21 So. 3d 51, 53–54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 253. See Sch. Bd. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009); McKendry v. State, 641 
So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994).  
 254. See Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So. 3d at 1233 (explaining that in construing statutes, a specific 
statute governing a particular subject takes precedence over a conflicting more general statute); People Against Tax 
Rev. Mismanagement, Inc. v. Cty. of Leon, 583 So. 2d 1373, 1377 (Fla. 1991); see also State v. Raydo, 713 So. 2d 
996, 1001 (Fla. 1998); McKendry, 641 So. 2d at 46 (“[A] specific statute covering a particular subject area always 
controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms.”). Where a specific and general 
statute are inconsistent, “[t]he more specific statute is considered to be an exception to the general terms of the more 
comprehensive statute.” McKendry, 641 So. 2d at 46. 
 255. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); see id. § 162.09. 
 256. See id. § 162.09. 
 257. See Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering 
Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 258. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 
2d 296, 300–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
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partial annulment at section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes, then section 162.09(3) 
could still prevail, or there would be great deference to local governments in 
determining whether both parties could be charged.259   
It is fair to examine any necessary and appropriate alternative legal theories so 
that the statutes can be interpreted together in order to give effect to 
the legislative intent.260 Although one might argue that the legislative intent was to 
carve out an exception to section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes as it relates to 
mobile home park lot tenancies, based upon the literal wording of section 723.024 
of the Florida Statutes261 in evaluating section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, 
paragraph (1) provides that “the unit of local government shall cite the responsible 
party for the violation,” whereas paragraph (2) provides that an “administrative or 
civil proceeding may not be brought against a mobile home owner or mobile home 
park owner for any duty or responsibility” resulting from the other and as provided 
for in sections 723.022 and 723.023 of the Florida Statutes.262 Section 723.024 of the 
Florida Statutes is not clear and is conflicting and results in an ambiguity that 
undermines its clarity by its use of “may” and “shall” in different parts of the statute 
that appear to permit a local government to charge either a mobile home owner or 
mobile home park owner, or both, with identical code violations.263 
Another issue with this statute is that its introduction fails to exclude any other 
Florida statute. Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes provides: “Notwithstanding 
any other provision of this chapter or of any local law, ordinance, or code . . . .” This 
statute attempts to define who can be charged and under which circumstances code 
violations can be applied against responsible parties.264 The qualifying language in 
the first sentence of Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes provides that there 
should be no other provision of Chapter 723 or of any local law, ordinance, or 
provision that is inconsistent with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, but leaves 
out important words, such as any other provision of law or statute in section 723.024 
of the Florida Statutes.265 The legislature failed to specify that any other Florida 
statute that is inconsistent with section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes has been 
 ________________________  
 259. See Flo-Sun Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037 (Fla. 2001); Panama City Beach Comm. Redevelopment 
Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Las Olas Tower v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 742 So. 2d 308, 
311–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
 260. See Blanton v. City of Pinellas Park, 887 So. 2d 1224, 1230 (Fla. 2004); Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 
768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). 
 261. See Scott Gordon, New Law May Help Manufactured Housing ROCs Deal With Code Violations, 
FLORIDA ROC (June 23, 2011),  
http://www.floridaroc.com/2011/06/articles/news-of-note-for-rocs/new-law-may-help-manufactured-housing-rocs-
deal-with-code-violations/; Florida Statute 723.024, THE RICHARDS LAW GROUP (June 23, 2011), 
http://www.richardslawgroup.com/rlg/florida-statute-723-024/. These commentaries were written shortly after 
enactment of the statute, but they do not discuss or raise the questions made in this article. Only time will tell how 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is construed. 
 262. See discussion supra Parts VI.A and XI.A–B; FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022–723.023 (2016). 
 263. See supra note 262. 
 264. See generally FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). 
 265. See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 154 (Fla. 2002) (explaining that the statute in question 
specifically repealed inconsistent laws); Flo-Sun, Inc., 783 So. 2d at 1034 (providing that the air and water pollution 
section 403.191 of the Florida Statutes constitutes an additional and cumulative remedy to abate pollution). 
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overruled or repealed if it is inconsistent with section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes.266   
Another issue is that if section 723.024 is read literally, this statute may have the 
effect of partially repealing approximately thirty years of code enforcement law and 
procedure that is contrary to long term precedent and policy.267 Ever since Chapter 
166 of the Florida Statutes was enacted, local governments’ code enforcement 
purpose and strategy has been to make a real property owner ultimately responsible 
for code violations and liens that run with the land.268 Long-standing agency and 
strict liability principles have existed since the inception of Chapter 166 of the 
Florida Statutes.269 There is a long-term historical recognition by the legislature and 
the judiciary that code violations and liens run with the land.270  
B. Is There a Way to Reconcile Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and 
Section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes?   
Although courts are required to interpret statutory language together to give 
effect to the legislature’s intent,271 the inconsistent use of the words “may” and 
“shall” in section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, and the failure of the legislature to 
expressly override prior Florida statutes that are not contained in section 723.024 of 
the Florida Statutes, conveys a confusing and inconsistent meaning of legislative 
intent.272 However, if a local government can decide who is the responsible party 
after code violations are investigated, then such a construction might permit a local 
government to charge one or both parties with identical code violations in order for 
the special magistrate to air out code violation charges by determining whether one 
or both of the parties are responsible for the code violations in mobile home park lot 
tenancies. Thus, a reasonable construction of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes 
in light of section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes is to allow local governments to 
prosecute mobile home owners and mobile home park owners for code violations as 
long as there is substantial, competent evidence to support a conviction.273 Of course, 
this could occur after the special magistrate considers the criteria provided in 
sections 723.022 and 723.023 as guidance to a local government rather than a legal 
obstacle or barrier to prosecuting code violations and whether there is substantial 
 ________________________  
 266. See FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016); Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 
452, 454–56 (Fla. 1992); Wilson v. Palm Beach Cty., 62 So. 3d 1247, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); 
City of Coconut Creek v. Broward Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 430 So. 2d 959, 963 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).  
 267. See Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Monroe Cty. v. Whispering 
Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); City of Gainesville Code Enf’t Bd. v. Lewis, 536 So. 
2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).  
 268. See Henley, 971 So. 2d at 1000; Whispering Pines Assocs., 697 So. 2d at 875; City of Gainesville Code 
Enf’t Bd., 536 So. 2d at 1150; FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06(05), 162.09(3) (2016). 
 269. See discussion supra Section IV. 
 270. See supra notes 1–3, 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 271. See discussion supra Part XI. 
 272. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 198–99 (Fla. 2007); Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. 
Hilyer Sod Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278–79 (Fla. 2003); Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 
1229–30 (Fla. 2000). 
 273. See Panama City Beach Comm. Redevelopment Agency v. State, So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Flo-
Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037 (Fla. 2001). 
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competent evidence to sustain the charges.274 This is an approach that is necessary 
and reasonable because it may be difficultif not impossibleto determine who is 
the responsible party by merely looking at section 723.024 of the Florida Statute 
without granting local governments the prerogative to decide which of the parties 
ought to be charged in determining if there is substantial, competent evidence to do 
so.275   
There is still uniformity of enforcement of code violations if a local government 
retains deference to decide responsibility in accordance with the evidence, but is not 
mandated to follow section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes.276 If a local government 
retains deference to decide whether to charge a mobile home owner or mobile home 
park owner or both, it can determine whether there is a violation based upon the facts 
and circumstances of the case.277 In determining which party is responsible, a local 
government special magistrate ought to be open to questions concerning common 
areas in mobile home parks, which can become embroiled in disputes involving 
boundary and use restrictions imposed by a mobile home park owner’s declarations 
documents.278 Habitability, including lot cleanliness of a mobile home owner, can be 
impacted by excessive flooding and stagnant standing water, which could be the 
result of properly or improperly designed and constructed water drainage systems 
coming from common areas that are the responsibility of a mobile home park 
owner.279 Erosion of the land where the mobile home rests may occur, resulting in a 
residential lot’s demise that grounds a residential shelter.280 Mosquito infestation and 
other dangerous conditions may arise on account of leaking and runoff from a 
defective drainage system that does not fulfill its intended purpose resulting in an 
uninhabitable shelter and lot.281 Restrictions on the use of, ingress to, or egress from 
a mobile home owner’s residence can impact habitability.282 
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes incorporates each party’s general 
obligations and seems to make it simple to determine which party is responsible, but 
underlying facts and circumstances can make it complex to determine which party is 
responsible in maintaining compliance with local government code provisions and 
 ________________________  
 274. See Sarasota Cty. v. Bow Point on the Gulf Condo. Developers, LLC, 974 So. 2d 431, 432–33 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007); Orange Cty. v. Lewis, 859 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Richbon, Inc. v. Miami-Dade 
Cty., 791 So. 2d 505, 508 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 275. See Killearn Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Family Ltd. P’ship, 21 So. 3d 51, 52–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); 
Pilgrim v. Crescent Lake Mobile Colony, 582 So. 2d 649, 651–52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Pappert v. Mobilinium 
Assocs. V., 512 So. 2d 1096, 1097–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
 276. Florida law suggests that great deference must be given to a local government’s interpretation of a statute, 
except when construction is “clearly erroneous,” because local government officials have an expertise that lay 
persons do not. See Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jacobs, 810 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2002); BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. 
Johnson, 708 So. 2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1998).   
 277. See supra note 276. The legislature has delegated to local governments the authority to prosecute code 
enforcement violations and the power to enforce section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes. See Ch. 162, Fla. Stat. 
(2016).   
 278. See Walton Cty. v. Stop Beach Renourishment, 998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008); Carlandia Corp. v. 
Obernauer, 695 So. 2d 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Tower House Condo., Inc. v. Millman, 410 So. 2d (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1981); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).   
 279. See FLA. STAT. §§ 723.022, 723.023, 723.024 (2016). 
 280. Id.  
 281. Id. 
 282. Id.  
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utilities, infrastructure, and common areas.283 Yet if section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes is literally read, the onus for repair and maintenance could be wrongly 
placed onto the mobile home owner.284 Expert engineers would have to determine 
responsibility, and defects in common areas or infrastructure are more readily 
discoverable by mobile home park owners, who are better suited financially than are 
mobile home owners, who live on restricted budgets.285 What can result is that 
responsibility for keeping a lot habitable might unfortunately fall on a mobile home 
owner rather than a mobile home park owner regardless of the underlying facts and 
circumstances of the case.286   
An unknown number of code violations remain unnoticed or, worse, they may 
have been ignored by real property owners for years, and this includes violations 
existing in mobile home parks, which may have ignored long standing code 
violations on their real property out of fear of being prosecuted by local 
governments.287 In light of the potential for varying interpretations of section 
723.024 of the Florida Statutes that have been discussed in this article, the questions 
to be determined by local governments are: Which party is the responsible party; is 
the mobile home park owner or the mobile home owner solely responsible for their 
own violations, or can they both be responsible based on the facts and circumstances 
of the case; and if one or both are responsible, can an order be certified and recorded 
in the public records for lien purposes regardless of section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes?   
XII. IS ONE OR SEVERAL QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PERMISSIBLE IN 
DETERMINING WHO IS A RESPONSIBLE PARTY? 
Would it not be in the best interest of the local government to charge a mobile 
home owner and a mobile home park owner if there is a question of who is the 
 ________________________  
 283. See id. §§ 723.022, 723.024. This would, in all likelihood, include responsibility for repairs and 
replacement of roads, surface water management systems, and drainage pipes, among other things that are part of 
the common property. See Maronda Homes v. Lakeview Res. Home Ass’n, 127 So. 3d 1258, 1269–70 (Fla. 2013). 
 284. FLA. STAT. § 723.024 (2016). 
 285. See Maronda Homes, 127 So. 3d at 1269–70; Aspen-Tarpon Springs Ltd. P’ship v. Stuart, 635 So. 2d 
61, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (district court of appeal acknowledged that mobile home park owners and mobile 
home owners have an “economically unbalanced bargaining position” that favors mobile home park owners).   
 286. Aspen-Tarpon Springs, 635 So. at 63. 
 287. See discussion supra Part V. Some violations include overgrown vegetation, landscaping, and failure to 
clean away trash and debris culminating in an onslaught of rodents, vermin, and mosquitoes; failure to maintain real 
property and upkeep of dwellings by a mobile home owner involving structural damage that presents a danger to 
residents and neighbors; failure to abide by regulations that required clearance of lots, junk, abandoned vehicles, 
and debris sitting for excessive periods of time that result in danger, rust, filth, and rubbish; failure to correct fire 
and electrical code violations attributable to a mobile home owner’s neglect, carelessness, or abandonment; 
construction of an addition without a building permit that is not up to code that can be easily blown away during 
high winds and storms, and that is dangerous. See Harry M. Hipler, Do Code Enforcement Violations “Run with the 
Land”? Competing Interests of Local Governments and Private Parties and Their Constitutional Considerations in 
Code Enforcement Proceedings, 43 STETSON L. REV. 257, 258 (2013); Harry M. Hipler, Special Magistrates in 
Code Enforcement Proceedings: Local Government Agents or Arbiters of Fairness and Justice, 38 STETSON L. REV. 
519, 519–20 (2008); Jason Gibilisco, How Code Enforcement Mitigates Hoarding in the Community, 465 SJSU 
SCHOLAR WORKS: MASTER’S PROJECT, 1, 5–10, 
http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=etd_projects. 
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responsible party? This option may be the most expedient and least expensive 
alternative as the time and costs associated with resolving a dispute in one 
administrative proceeding is a supporting reason to join both parties in the same 
proceeding so as to give them an opportunity to provide evidence as to responsibility 
based upon the facts and circumstances.288 Evidence can be presented by the local 
government, and the land owner and non-real property owner can be given the 
opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf to refute charges so that all 
interested parties air out the evidence and present their defenses in the same 
proceeding.289 When circumstances warrant, a single proceeding is best for the 
parties and a local government, rather than piecemeal or multifaceted proceedings 
that invariably costs more and may result in longer, protracted proceedings before 
administrative finality and certainty is reached.290 The question whether the mobile 
home owner and mobile home park owner ought to be joined in one proceeding 
should remain open for consideration by local government counsel, and this should 
be regarded as an option rather than a necessity for local government counsel after 
considering whether a mobile home owner and/or the mobile home park owner 
should be charged separately or jointly. If section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is 
followed literally and only one party is charged, there is nothing to preclude the party 
appearing in a quasi-judicial proceeding from making an argument and presenting 
evidence that the non-joined party is responsible; and if it turns out that the party 
charged is not responsible, a subsequent prosecution could be filed against the non-
joined party to determine responsibility in a subsequent proceeding.291   
There should be no question that Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, along with 
sections 723.022, 723.023, and 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, require local 
governments to act with due diligence in determining which party is responsible for 
code violations after considering the statutory factors provided in these statutes and 
local government regulations.292 This can be accomplished only after there is 
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the code violations in determining 
 ________________________  
 288. See discussion supra Parts VI.A, C–E, X. 
 289. See Horne v. USDA, 133 U.S. 2053, 2062–64 (2013) (Horne I); Horne v. USDA, 135 U.S. 2419, 2433 
(2015) (Horne II). For purposes of this article, Horne I is pertinent, because the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to consider Horne’s case. The US Supreme Court first ruled that Horne’s 
attempt to avoid the AMAA by restructuring his farm as a combined raisin grower and handler was ineffective, 
because the law applied to Horne, and his challenge to the raisin reserve was ripe. The Supreme Court of the United 
States also concluded that the Tucker Act did not require Horne to sue in the Court of Federal Claims, because the 
AMAA had a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit to 
consider the merits of Horne’s takings claim in the same proceeding. 
 290. Horne I, 133 U.S. at 2062–64; Horne II, 135 U.S. at 2433; Delray Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency for 
Health Care, 5 So. 3d 26, 29–30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Wood v. Dep’t of Prof. Reg., 490 So. 2d 1079, 1081–82 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); see Austin Tupler Trucking, Inc. v. Hawkins, 377 So. 2d 679, 681 (Fla. 1979). 
 291. Equitable estoppel was an issue raised in Castro v. Metro-Dade County Code Enforcement, but the 
language in this decision calls attention to the possibility of disputes as to which party is responsible. Castro v. 
Metro-Dade Cty. Code Enf’t., 967 So. 2d 230, 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“One party will not be permitted to 
invite another onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the detriment of the party induced 
or permitted to stand thereon.”).  
 292. FLA. STAT. §§ 162.06–162.08, 723.022–723.24 (2016). 
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whether there is substantial, competent evidence to support a conviction.293 Who 
other than the local government code enforcement prosecution counsel and team is 
uniquely qualified to decide who should be charged and for which violations?294 In 
any quasi-judicial hearing before a special magistrate, the respondents should be able 
to make whatever defenses they deem necessary and proper; if either party disagrees 
with the result of the code enforcement hearing, then an appeal by way of a writ of 
certiorari can be filed in the circuit court to consider the ruling and any issues that 
were raised in the quasi-judicial proceeding.295 
XIII. SECTION 723.024 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES AND THE IMPACT OF 
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
A local government must be careful not to selectively enforce code enforcement 
ordinances against similarly situated parties.296 A local government must 
evenhandedly and uniformly enforce any type of code violations against all persons 
in the same or similarly situated positions.297 If a local government is charged with 
selectively enforcing violations against one violator but not others in similar or 
identical situations, this could result in protracted disputes and litigation, causing a 
lack of trust and confidence in the local governments’ credibility and the prospect of 
potential money damage awards against the local governments if selective 
prosecution and enforcement is proved.298   
XIV. CONCLUSION 
The enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes raises many questions 
that have yet to be resolved. Ever since the enactment of section 162.09(3) in 1987, 
code enforcement violations and liens have run with the land.299 After section 
723.024 of the Florida Statutes became effective on June 2, 2011, the question 
became whether the legislature has carved out an exception for mobile home park 
lot tenancies to bifurcate responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile 
home park owners.300 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes says that each of these 
parties has its own responsibility in mobile home park lot tenancies, which is a 
 ________________________  
 293. See Sarasota Cty. v. Bow Point on the Gulf Condo. Developers, LLC, 974 So. 2d 431, 432–33 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2007); Orange Cty. v. Lewis, 859 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Lee Cty. v. Sunbelt Equities, 
II, Ltd. P’ship,, 619 So. 2d 996, 1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 294. See discussion supra Part VII. 
 295. FLA. STAT. § 162.11 (2016); Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So. 2d 1214, 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 296. See Zuccarelli v. Barfield, 199 So. 3d 399, 405–06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016); Powell v. City of Sarasota, 
953 So. 2d 5, 7–8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); Ads in Motion – Fla. Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 429 So. 2d 806, 
806–07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
 297. See Zuccarelli, 199 So. 3d at 405–06; Powell, 953 So. 2d at 7–8; Ads in Motion – Fla. Inc., 429 So. 2d 
at 806–07. 
 298. See Metro. Dade Cty. Fair Hous. & Emp’t Appeals Bd. v. Sunrise Village Mobile Home Park Inc., 511 
So. 2d 962, 965–66 (Fla. 1987); Fla. Dept. of Transp. v. E.T. Legg & Co., 472 So. 2d 1336, 1336–38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985); Harry M. Hipler, Special Magistrates in Code Enforcement Proceedings: Local Government Agents or 
Arbiters of Fairness and Justice?, 38 STETSON L. REV. 519, 519–20 (2008). 
 299. See supra notes 1–3. 
 300. See discussion supra Parts II, VI.A. 
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reversal of approximately thirty years of code enforcement law and procedure.301 
Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is deceptively simple, until one studies the 
statute and finds that it contains inconsistencies and contradictions.302 The wording 
of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes undermines long-standing agency and 
strict liability principles that have existed since the 1980s in code enforcement law 
and procedure.303 Section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes arguably removes agency 
and strict liability from section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes as it pertains to 
mobile home park lot tenancies. By enacting section 723.024 of the Florida Statute, 
the legislature appears to have involved itself in attempting to reshape code 
enforcement law and procedure, and it has placed itself into the dynamics of real 
property owners and lessees’ responsibilities in code enforcement violations and 
liens with the help of mobile home park owners’ interest groups.304            
There are still questions that remain after the enactment of section 723.024 of 
the Florida Statutes. Is the statute’s wording clear and unambiguous? Does this 
statute conflict with the separation of powers doctrine in article I, section 3 of the 
Florida Constitution? What effect does the preemption doctrine in article VIII, 
section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution have on section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes and local governments’ code provisions? Is section 723.024 of the Florida 
Statutes mandatory or discretionary as to code enforcement law and procedure? Can 
section 723.024 be reconciled with section 162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes and can 
they both be construed together? Is there a legal duty, as distinguished from a moral 
obligation, on mobile home park owners to report mobile home owners to local 
governments if there appears to be a code violation? In light of the different 
interpretations that can be given to section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the 
constitutional considerations that need to be addressed, will local governments 
decide for themselves how to construe and apply the statute resulting in confusion 
and various interpretations from one local government to another?   
For the skeptic, why should a discussion about the conflicts within section 
723.024 of the Florida Statutes and the tensions existing between that statute and 
section 162.09(3) matter? No one is being sent to jail for a crime they did not commit, 
as Chapter 162 prosecutions are non-criminal.305 Code enforcement only concerns 
 ________________________  
 301. See discussion supra Parts II, XI 
 302. See discussion supra Parts II, VI.A, XI. 
 303. See discussion supra Parts III–IV. 
 304. The Florida Manufactured Housing Association (FMHA) represents the spectrum of park owner 
interests. Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., http://www.fmha.org/about-fmha/ (last visited Nov. 22, 
2016). Although lobbying is protected free speech, U.S. v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953), there is no question but 
that interest groups have become powerful organizations that some call a fourth branch of government. See Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” that We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L.J. 485, 528 (2008); Cornelia 
Woll, Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of Business Lobbyists, 27 J. PUB. POL’Y 57, 65 (2007). 
 305. See FLA. STAT. §§ 162.02, 162.06–162.07, 162.09 (2016); see also Thomas v. State, 583 So. 2d 336, 340 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 614 So. 2d 468, 471 (Fla. 1993) (suggesting that ordinance violations were non-
criminal in nature). Article I, section 18 of the Florida Constitution provides that there can be no imprisonment for 
local government ordinance violations, “except as provided by law.” In Attorney General Opinion 2009-29, the 
Attorney General suggested that a county is an “administrative agency” for purposes of article I, section 18 of the 
Florida Constitution, therefore no imprisonment is allowed “except as provided by law.” More specifically, the 
Attorney General stated that a county could not enact an ordinance providing that the failure to timely pay a civil 
penalty imposed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 162, Florida Statutes, was a criminal misdemeanor, and is therefore 
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real and personal property code violations, and these violations can be corrected, so 
what is there to fear? Are code violations de minimis in the total scheme of things? 
Local governments’ goals in enforcing uniform code provisions is to maintain good 
quality, habitable, and livable neighborhoods by obtaining compliance with local 
government code regulations, not to assess a tax or special assessment against a real 
property owner and violator.306 What harm can result even if the mobile home park 
owner and the mobile home owner/tenant ignore code violations, especially when 
local governments may substantially mitigate or abate accrued fines upon 
compliance with local government code regulations?307 These are some of the 
concerns raised by residents and property owners who may claim “so what” as to the 
impact of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes. 
The enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may effectively change 
what has been long standing policy that made landowners strictly responsible for 
code violations. If it is determined that this statute results in a bifurcation of 
responsibility between mobile home owners and mobile home park owners, then 
long standing code enforcement law and procedure will be changed between mobile 
home park owners and mobile home owners.308 There is tension and conflict within 
section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, as well as between sections 723.024 and 
162.09(3) of the Florida Statutes. If these statutes cannot be reconciled and 
harmonized then the public may be subjected to varying interpretations from one 
local government to another.309 If section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes is construed 
literally, that position may make code enforcement less consistent rather than more 
consistent with long standing policy of Chapter 162 of the Florida Statutes, which 
 ________________________  
proscribed from doing so by article I, section 18 of the Florida Constitution. Still, it would appear that a local 
government might be able to enact an ordinance providing for imprisonment as long as a state statute has not 
preempted a subject from enactment of laws by local governments. When the legislature takes action and enacts a 
statute, a local government cannot adopt or enforce an ordinance that conflicts with the state statute and any penalty 
provided by a statute. In Phantom of Clearwater v. Pinellas County, 894 So. 2d 1011, 1021–21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2005), the court suggested that a local government could enact an ordinance providing for a penalty as long as it 
does not exceed the penalty imposed by the state statute. See also Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County, 3 
So. 3d 309 (Fla. 2008), which approved the decision in Phantom of Clearwater. However, if criminal penalties can 
be enacted by local governments under these restricted circumstances, any prosecution involving a criminal violation 
would have to be filed in county court. See FLA. STAT. § 162.22, Fla. Stat. (2016) (providing enforcement methods: 
“These enforcement methods may include, but are not limited to, the issuance of a citation, a summons, or a notice 
to appear in county court or arrest for violation of municipal ordinances as provided for in chapter 901.”). Still, the 
question of whether a local government should involve itself into criminal matters is left for another day. 
 306. See Collier Cty. v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1016 (Fla. 1999); Desiderio Corp. v. City of Boynton Beach, 
39 So. 3d 487, 494 (Fla. 2010). 
 307. See FLA. STAT. § 162.09(2)(c) (2016). 
 308. Is section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes an opening of a Pandora’s Box and of the flood-gates to further 
diminution by the legislature of the long-standing principal that code violations and liens run with the land? We will 
just have to wait and see. See Collier Cty., 733 So. 2d at 1016.  
 309. Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So. 2d 1029, 1037–38 (Fla. 2001); Panama City Beach Cmty. Redevelopment 
Agency v. State, 831 So. 2d 662, 665–69 (Fla. 2002); Las Olas Tower v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 742 So. 2d 308, 
312–13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 1999). In rezoning matters that are considered to be quasi-judicial proceedings, Florida 
law grants local governments great deference in their decision-making authority. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Brevard Cty., Fla. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Samara Dev’p Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 
1990); Public Employees Relations Comm’n v. Dade Cty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 467 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1985); 
Daniel v. Fla. State Turnpike Auth., 213 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968); Sw. Ranches Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Broward 
Cty., 502 So. 2d 931 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). 
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has made violations and liens run with the land in order to insure quicker and 
speedier compliance with code violations.310  
While there should be cooperation between residents located in mobile home 
parks in mobile home park lot tenancies, is there a guarantee after enactment of 
section 723.024 that mobile home park owners and mobile home owners will 
cooperate with each other to obtain compliance? Cooperation matters in helping a 
community remain habitable and livable; if each real property owner helps the local 
government obtain compliance with its uniform code provisions, there is hope that 
the values of real property will gradually increase in value, resulting in an increase 
in the local government’s tax base as the health, safety, and welfare of the community 
is safeguarded for all.311   
The legislative enactment of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes may be 
business as usual. Whether special interests got the legislature to carve out an 
exception to a long-standing policy that has proven valuable to local governments 
and the public for years by exempting mobile home park owners from strict 
responsibility for code violations on their land remains open for discussion and 
dispute. Until there is a better understanding of the impact and ultimate construction 
and enforceability of section 723.024 of the Florida Statutes, these questions will 
continue to exist and we will just have to wait and see. 
 
 ________________________  
 310. Henley v. MacDonald, 971 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that code violation 
run with the land and can make title unmarketable by subjecting the buyer to administrative proceedings and 
litigation cost after closing); see also FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016). 
 311. Harry M. Hipler, Do Code Enforcement Violations “Run with the Land”? Competing Interests of Local 
Governments and Private Parties and Their Constitutional Considerations in Code Enforcement Proceedings, 43 
STETSON L. REV. 257, 297 (2013); see FLA. STAT. § 162.02 (2016). 
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